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THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL
MATTERS: THE SEARCH FOR
BALANCE
1. Different perceptions of Brussels
What is the European Union doing to control crime?
In the popular discussion, there appears to be three
common opinions of the impact of the European
Union on criminal justice. One opinion is dismissive:
the European Union spends its time fine-tuning the
legal details of instruments that have little impact
on everyday life. A second opinion is that the
European Union is evolving into a super-state that
(perhaps misguidedly?) is seeking to harmonise
criminal and procedural law in all the Member
States. The third opinion is that the European Union
is working hand in hand with law-and-order
adherents, focusing on the control of crime and
favouring a more punitive criminal policy.
While scattered evidence can be marshalled to
support any or indeed all of these views, they remain
caricatures of reality. European Union cooperation
in criminal justice has evolved so rapidly, and
extended so far, that we should not be surprised at
how difficult it is to give an objective assessment of
what has been done, what is being done, and what
will be done next. The present paper seeks to place
the work of the EU within the context of broader
international cooperation, and thus give a better
sense of the direction in which EU criminal justice
has evolved and how it may evolve in the years to
come. After looking at the evidence for all three of
the opinions just mentioned, the paper suggests that
European Union cooperation in criminal justice does
not fit any of the three views. Instead, EU criminal
justice can be seen to be national criminal justice
taken to a new level, with much the same goals and
inner tensions as in any and all of the Member States.
2. The background: the evolution and
outlines of European Union
cooperation in criminal justice
The European Union represents a unique form of
international co-operation. Almost all Western and
Central European countries have joined together to
form an intergovernmental structure. Twenty-five
countries acting together deal with important policy
questions that have cross-border implications. These
decisions concern not only law enforcement and
criminal justice, but also for example migration and
border control, taxation, the economy, consumer
affairs, industry, agriculture, and so on. Further
expansion of the European Union is underway.
Bulgaria and Romania are set to join in 2007, and
negotiations have begun with Croatia, FYROM
(Macedonia)1 and Turkey. More applications can be
expected in particular from southeastern Europe
(Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia).2
Originally the European Union (then referred to as
the European Communities) focused on economic
integration and the establishment of the Common
Market. The Common Market is based on the
principle that persons, products, services and capital
should be allowed to move freely from one country
to the next. Such freedom of movement obviously
benefits the economy, but it also opens up new
opportunities for crime, and new possibilities for
offenders to slip from one country to another, trying
to evade justice.
1 Macedonia is referred to officially in the EU as “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, abbreviated as FYROM.
2 It should be noted that all of the Member States of the European Union are also members of a separate intergovernmental organisation,
the Council of Europe.3 (Note the potential for confusion in terminology: the Council of Europe is not the same as the European
Council.) The Council of Europe has adopted a large number of conventions, recommendations and resolutions on judicial cooperation,
including not only an extradition treaty (1957) and a mutual legal assistance treaty (1959), but also the important European Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
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In such a situation, the conventions that had been
adopted by the Council of Europe were no longer
sufficiently comprehensive and effective to match
the pace of integration in the European
Communities. For this reason, the 1992 Maastricht
Treaty extended the mandate of the European
Communities to include co-operation in justice and
home affairs.3
Following the Maastricht Treaty, decisions in the
European Union on justice and home affairs are
primarily made by three bodies, the Council of
Ministers, the Commission and the European
Parliament. In addition, and in particular after the
entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the
European Court of Justice exercises some judicial
functions. Usually, the Commission makes the
proposals that lead in time to EU decisions, although
also a Member State can do so. The decisions are
prepared in working groups with representatives
from the different Member States, and are adopted
by the Council of Ministers. For justice and home
affairs, this Council consists of the Ministers of
justice and internal affairs of each Member State.
The European Parliament is consulted, but its views
are not binding. Decisions under the third pillar
require consensus: each and every one of the twenty-
five Member States must agree to the decision, or at
least abstain from voting against the measure in
question.
The most important types of decisions are called
framework decisions. These establish a certain goal,
such as the criminalisation of certain conduct, or
the establishment of certain procedures for cross-
border cooperation. It is then up to each Member
State to change its own legislation in order to achieve
the goals that have been set in the framework
decisions. Framework decisions are binding on the
Member States. They are, in a way the third pillar
counterparts to directives in the first pillar. However,
other than is the case with directives, they do not
have direct effect. This means that individuals cannot
rely on them directly against the state. Nonetheless,
they may have some form of “direct applicability”
under certain circumstances, following the Court’s
judgement in the Pupino case.4
As with framework decisions, also decisions under
the third pillar are binding but do not have direct
effect. “Decisions” are used for any purpose other
than approximation of law, for instance to set up
bodies such as Eurojust.
The European Union has also drafted its own treaties
to update and supplement the Council of Europe
treaties. This work led to extradition treaties adopted
in 1995 and 1996 and to a mutual legal assistance
treaty adopted in 2000. The MLA treaty entered into
force in August 2005. Neither extradition treaty has
entered into force, since they required ratification
by all Member States. The ratification process was
still in progress when the need for the treaties was
obviated by the adoption of the framework decision
on the European Arrest Warrant.
The framework decisions, the decisions and the
treaties, together with for example the judgments
of the European Court, form part of what is known
as the acquis communautaire of the European Union,
the body of law that is binding on all Member States
and (in a political sense) also on countries seeking
to join the EU. Through the EEA agreement, they
also have an effect in Norway, Iceland, Switzerland
and Liechtenstein, and are also important to other
neighbouring countries that are potential candidates
to the EU.
In 1997, the European Union decided on a set of
measures (an “action plan”) that needed to be taken
in response to organised crime. These measures
included the adoption of decisions related to the
criminalization of participation in a criminal
organisation and money laundering, more effective
measures for the tracing of assets, the identification
of best practice in mutual assistance, and close
cooperation with the countries that had recently
applied for membership in the European Union. A
system for mutual evaluation was set up, by which
teams of experts from different countries would
assess how efficiently each Member State was
3 Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, cooperation in police and criminal matters forms what is called the “third
pillar” of the European Union . The first pillar consists essentially of issues related to the original internal market as well as asylum,
immigration and cooperation in civil law, and the second pillar consists of foreign policy and security policy.
4 Case C-150/03, 16 June 2005.
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dealing with a certain issue, such as extradition or
mutual legal assistance. The action plan also created
what is known as the European Judicial Network,
which allows the practitioners responsible for
extradition and mutual legal assistance to be in direct
contact with their counterparts in other countries
(instead of, as is the usual case elsewhere in the
world, going through diplomatic channels). Because
of the strong support given on the highest political
level to the action plan, many of the measures called
for in the action plan were adopted in less than three
years – an impressive achievement in international
cooperation.
Two years later, in October 1999, a special European
Council organised in Tampere, Finland, laid out a
programme for the EU to follow in dealing with
questions such as migration, asylum, criminal and
civil justice and responding to organized crime.
Each of the Member States of the European Union
has its own unique criminal justice system, with its
own criminal and procedural laws. As a result, the
national definition even of basic types of crime, and
the rights enjoyed by suspects and defendants, can
vary considerably. These differences can complicate
or even prevent extradition or mutual assistance. For
example, many Member States have traditionally
required double criminality as a condition for
extradition or mutual assistance: the offence in
question must be recognised as an offence in the
Member State requesting extradition or assistance
and in the Member State asked to extradite or to
provide assistance.
There are basically two ways to overcome these
national differences in law: either require that all
states have more or less the same laws
(harmonisation), or have the states agree to enforce
decisions and judgments made in another state
(mutual recognition). Those in favour of
harmonisation argue that the laws defining the main
forms of cross-border crime, as well as the basic
elements of criminal procedure, should be the same
in all EU Member States. Those in favour of mutual
recognition, in turn, argue that harmonisation is not
necessary, as long as the courts and other authorities
of each Member State are prepared to enforce
decisions taken in other Member States. (A point of
comparison is article IV(1) of the Constitution of
the United States, according to which each state
should give “full faith and credit” to the judicial
proceedings of each other state.)
In 1999, the European Union threw its weight on
the side of mutual recognition. However, the
European Union also decided that work should
continue on harmonisation of key areas of
legislation, such as the prevention and control of
money laundering.
Two years later, this work on legal integration was
hastened by the impact of the terrorist attacks in New
York and Washington, D.C. on 11 September 2001.
The attacks led to the adoption of an EU decision
that harmonised domestic legislation defining
terrorist crimes. Furthermore, only three months
after the attacks, the European Union agreed its first
decision on mutual recognition, the so-called
European arrest warrant. This was formally adopted
on 13 June 2002. This framework decision replaced
extradition proceedings entirely with a much more
rapid procedure for the surrender of fugitives. Soon
after, a decision was adopted on the mutual
recognition of orders on the freezing of property and
evidence. As a result of these two decisions, once a
court in any Member State orders the arrest of a
certain suspect or convicted offender, and the
freezing of his or her property, the courts in any and
all other Member States can and should enforce these
immediately.5
Towards the end of 2004, the European Union
reviewed the progress it had made since 1999, and
decided, by approving the so-called Hague
Programme, on what further work was needed to
develop the European area of freedom, security and
justice. Between 2005 and 2010, decisions were to
be made that would help to overcome cross-border
problems connected with, for example, minimum
standards for dealing with suspects and defendants,
the use of pre-trial detention, the collection of
evidence, the checking of criminal records, and the
transfer of sentenced offenders to their state of
5 One more consequence of the terrorist attack was that the EU decided to supplement the existing patchwork of bilateral treaties that the
.Member States had with the United States, with more general and updated EU-US treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance
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nationality or state of residence. Attention was also
to be paid to developing good practice, not only in
extradition and mutual legal assistance, but also for
example in crime prevention.
The new Constitutional Treaty signed on 29 October
2004 (if and when ratified by all 25 Member States)
would lead, among other things, to the elimination
of the distinction between pillars. According to the
proposal, decisions even on justice and home affairs
would no longer have to be made by consensus, but
by a “qualified majority.”6 The Commission would
in practice have the right of initiative, although also
one-fourth of all Member States, acting together, can
present an initiative. The European Parliament
would have a considerably stronger role in
influencing the contents of decisions.7
3. The first claim: “European Union
cooperation in criminal justice has
had little impact”
3.1. Overview of progress in EU cooperation in
criminal justice
Perhaps the most common opinion of the European
Union is that it is a massive intergovernmental
bureaucracy that churns out directives and
regulations that have no real impact in practice (other
than costing a lot of money and causing endless
frustration to those entrepreneurs who have to put
up with all of this tomfoolery).
But are, in fact, EU provisions on cooperation in
criminal justice ineffective? If we take into
consideration the fact that this cooperation did not
really get underway until the 1992 Treaty of
Maastricht gave the EU competence in justice and
home affairs, quite a lot of work has been done in
the dozen or so years since then. This can be
illustrated by comparing present EU cooperation
with the “status quo” of ordinary international
cooperation, among the police, prosecutors and the
judiciary. Such a comparison in provided in the table
below on page 11.
3.2. Police cooperation
The global status quo:
The general rule around the world is that law
enforcement personnel do not have powers outside
of their jurisdiction. Notices are communicated
through Interpol. A few countries have posted liaison
officers abroad, and informal contacts are used on
an ad hoc basis. Otherwise, officially, information
may not and is not exchanged except through formal
bilateral channels, and even then only in a few cases.
Coordination of cross-border investigations is rare,
and requires considerable preparation through
formal channels.
The European Union reality:
· an international body, Europol, co-
ordinates cross-border investigations, and
seeks to provide support to domestic law
enforcement services in specialist fields.
· a network of liaison officers has been
developed.
· joint investigative teams (with members
from the law enforcement agencies of
different countries) can be set up.
· Europol produces threat assessments on
organized crime, bringing together data
from all Member States.
Within the framework of the Schengen conventions,
which are in force in over one half of the EU Member
States,
· the Schengen information system allows
national law enforcement agencies to
share data on many key issues almost
instantaneously with their colleagues in
other countries. The system encompasses
6 What constitutes a “qualified majority” would depend on a combination of the number of Member States in support, and the size of these
Member States.
7 As of August 2006, fifteen out of twenty-five Member States have ratified the Constitutional Treaty. However, in referendums organized
in France and the Netherlands during the spring of 2005, a clear majority voted against ratification. At the time of writing, the process of
ratification is basically on hold. The European Union is engaged in a delicate debate over whether and how to proceed with ratification.
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”ordinary” international cooperation EU cooperation
police
co-operation
• co-operation is based on informal contacts,
relatively rare bilateral agreements, and the
work of Interpol
• only a few non-EU states (in particular the
USA) use liaison officers
• information can be exchanged through
Interpol. Otherwise, information is ex-
changed through slow official channels or
through informal channels
• Europol co-ordinates cross-border investigations and
provides support for national police authorities. Euro-
pol’s operational powers are to be developed
• the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) coordinates
investigations of offences directed against the financial
interests of the EU
• also other structures for police cooperation have been
established (such as cooperation among heads of police)
• an extensive liaison officer network has been created
(including through Europol)
• the possibility of establishing joint investigative teams
has been created (although so far, few such teams have
been set up in practice)
• the exchange of information is being developed, for
example through implementation of the “availability of
information” principle
• police cooperation is especially intensive among the so-
called Schengen countries (SIS, SIRENE, cross-border
supervision, controlled delivery etc.)
prosecutorial
co-operation
• prosecutorial cooperation is based on a very
few bilateral or multilateral agreements
• the International Prosecutors Association
provides a loose structure for cooperation
• Eurojust coordinates cross-border prosecutorial coop-
eration
• an increasing number of EU instruments permit direct
cooperation between and among prosecutorial authorities
• the European Judicial Network facilitates direct coop-
eration between prosecutorial authorities
• a liaison magistrate network has been established
• also the Schengen arrangements facilitate prosecutorial
cooperation
judicial
co-operation
• judicial cooperation (primarily extradition
and mutual legal assistance) is based on a
few bilateral or multilateral agreements
• requests go through central authorities or
through diplomatic channels
• often, requests are not answered, the re-
sponse comes too late, or comes in a form
that cannot be used in the courts of the re-
questing State
• all EU Member States are parties to the major multilat-
eral agreements on judicial cooperation (Council of
Europe 1957, 1959, 1990; United Nations 1988, 2000
and 2003)
• the EU has its own recent agreements on extradition
(replaced by the EAW) and mutual legal assistance
• the EU promotes standards of good practice, for example
through a rigorous peer review system
• mutual recognition of judicial decisions has become the
basis for judicial cooperation within the EU; the first in-
struments on mutual recognition have entered into force
(the EU arrest warrant; the freezing of property and evi-
dence; and fines)
harmonisation of
criminal law and
criminal procedure
• harmonisation is based on a few rare multi-
lateral agreements and on a number of non-
binding recommendations and resolutions,
all of which leave extensive discretion to
the State parties
• the EU has adopted a large number of instruments on the
harmonisation of criminal and procedural law, and these
have had an impact in practice
• attention has also been paid to the rights of victims, and
of suspects and defendants
wider international
cooperation and
technical assis-
tance
• technical assistance is given almost solely on
an uncoordinated ad hoc basis, through bilat-
eral arrangements
• multilateral technical assistance is rather
limited; even so, this may have a significant
impact in certain situations (Council of
Europe, UN, OECD, World Bank, etc)
• the impact of the EU is particularly strong on the evolution
of the legal systems of candidate countries
• the EU seeks to engage in coordinated international coop-
eration and, as appropriate, technical assistance with a
number of countries (the “New Neighbours”, the Mediter-
ranean countries, Latin America; China, the US and Can-
ada)
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some 50,000 terminals in the Member
States.
· law enforcement authorities are allowed
hot pursuit across borders (under certain
conditions).
· law enforcement authorities are allowed
to engage in surveillance in the territory
of other countries (under certain
conditions).
· law enforcement authorities are allowed
to engage in controlled delivery.
Europol
Europol was established in October 1998, when the
Europol Convention entered into force among the
(then) fifteen European Union countries. Europol is
an international organization that has its
headquarters in The Hague, in the Netherlands.
The objective of Europol is “to improve ... the
effectiveness and cooperation of the competent
authorities in the Member States in preventing and
combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and
other serious forms of international crime where
there are factual indications than an organized
criminal structure is involved and two or more
Member States are affected by the forms of crime in
question in such a way as to require a common
approach by the Member States owing to the scale,
significance and consequences of the offences
concerned.”
The principal tasks of Europol consist of
1) facilitating the exchange of information
between the Member States,
2) obtaining, collating and analysing information
and intelligence (including the preparation of annual
threat assessments regarding organized crime),
3) notifying the competent authorities of the
Member States of information concerning them and
of any connections identified between criminal
offences,
4) aiding investigations in the Member States by
forwarding all relevant information to the national
units, and
5) developing a computerized system of
collected information.
Europol is also charged with developing specialist
knowledge of the investigative procedures of the
competent authorities in the Member States and
providing advice on investigations, and with
providing strategic intelligence to assist with and
promote the efficient and effective use of the
resources available at the national level for
operational activities. For this purpose, Europol can
assist Member States through advice and research
in training, the organization and equipment of the
authorities, crime prevention methods, and technical
and forensic police methods and police procedures.
Work in progress. In October 1999, soon after the
Europol Convention entered into force, a special
European Union Council was held in Tampere,
Finland, to discuss the strengthening of the work of
the EU in justice and home affairs. In respect of
Europol, the Tampere meeting concluded, inter alia,
that “Europol’s role should be strengthened by
allowing it to receive operational data from Member
States and authorising it to ask Member States to
initiate, conduct or coordinate investigations or to
create joint investigative teams in certain areas of
crime, while respecting systems of judicial control
in Member States”. This was an important goal, since
it would allow Europol a considerably more active
role in investigations.
In March 2000, a new action plan against organized
crime was adopted.8  It contains a number of points
regarding Europol:
- Europol should be able to carry out
studies of practice at the national and
European Union level and of their
effectiveness, develop common strategies,
policies and tactics, organize meetings,
develop and implement common action
plans, carry out strategic analyses,
facilitate the exchange of information and
intelligence, provide analytical support for
multilateral national investigations,
provide technical, tactical and legal
support, offer technical facilities, develop
common manuals, facilitate training,
evaluate results, and advise the competent
authorities of the Member States.
8 The Prevention and Control of Organised Crime: A European Union Strategy for the beginning of the new Millennium.
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- consideration should be given to the
feasibility of setting up a database on
pending investigations, making it
possible to avoid any overlap between
investigations and to involve several
European competent authorities in the
same investigation.
- Europol should help in establishing a
research and documentation network on
cross-border crime, and in organizing
the collection, storage, processing,
analysis and exchange of relevant
information, including information held
by law enforcement services on reports
on suspicious financial transactions. The
establishment of compatible criminal
intelligence systems among Member
States should be a long-term goal.
Schengen
Due in part to the slowness with which police
cooperation was being developed in Europe and
to political differences of opinions over the extent
of this cooperation (the 1992 Maastricht Treaty,
which created the third pillar, was still in the
future), some members of the European Union
(originally, Belgium, France, Germany,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands) decided to
move among themselves to a “fast-track”
alternative. The result was the Schengen
Agreement of 1985 and the Schengen Convention
of 1990, which were designed to eliminate internal
frontier controls, provide for more intensive police
cooperation, and establish a shared data system.
The need for the “Schengen arrangements” arose
with one of the primary goals of economic
integration, the elimination of border controls on
the transit of persons, goods, capital and services.
Quite simply, the Schengen area was to become a
“passport-free zone.” Although this elimination
of border control undoubtedly promotes trade and
commerce, at the same time it makes more
difficult the task of controlling the entry and exit
of offenders and suspects.
The “Schengen group” currently consists of Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain and Sweden, as well as, from outside the EU,
Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.9 The United
Kingdom and Ireland have not joined the parts of
Schengen relating to border controls, since they wish
to retain separate passport controls. The ten new
Member States that joined on 1 May 2004 have not
yet been approved as “Schengen-ready,” but some may
join already during 2007.
Police cooperation within the framework of Schengen
includes cross-border supervision, “hot pursuit” across
borders into the territory of another Member State;
and controlled delivery (i.e. allowing a consignment
of illegal drugs to continue its journey in order to
discover the modus operandi of the offenders, or to
identify the ultimate recipients and their agents, in
particu-lar the main offenders). These forms of
cooperation have been hard-won: they did not see the
light of day until after protracted negotiations between
the Governments concerned, and even then they have
been hedged by a number of restrictions.
As a trade-off to ending checks on internal borders,
the Schengen countries agreed on the establishment
of the Schengen Information System (SIS). This
consists of a central computer (in Strasbourg, France)
linked to a national computer in each country, and to a
total of some 50,000 terminals. When fully operational,
data entered into any one computer (for example data
on wanted persons, undesirable aliens, persons to be
expelled or extradited, persons under surveillance, and
some stolen goods) would immediately be copied to
the other national information systems. An electronic
mail system (SIRENE; short for Supplementary
Information Request at the National Entry) allows for
the transfer of additional information, such as
extradition requests and fingerprints. Yet another data-
connected acronym is VISION, which refers to the
“Visa Inquiry System in an Open-Border Network”.
9 The principal reason for the inclusion of Norway and Iceland is that these two countries are part of the passport-free zone formed among
the Nordic countries. The other three Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are members of the Schengen group. Switzerland,
in turn, is surrounded by EU Member States.
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At present, work is underway on the development
of “Schengen II”, which could be called the second
generation of the information system.
The strength of the Schengen arrangements lies in
the fact that they allow for highly practical law
enforcement cooperation, at a level that is unique in
the world. At the same time, the arrangements have
been subjected to criticism. Although the
arrangements have been made specifically to
respond to the opening of the borders between the
countries in question, the question remains whether
these arrangements are still insufficient to respond
to the increased mobility of offenders. Secondly, the
arrangements do not include all European Union
countries, while on the other hand they do include
three non-EU countries (Iceland, Norway and
Switzerland). This inevitably leads to some practical
difficulties. Third, since there is no supervisory court
structure or any effective parliamentary review of
Schengen decisions, it has been suggested that
human rights concerns will receive less attention
that the law enforcement priorities. (On the other
hand, any actions taken would necessarily fall under
the jurisdiction of at least one of the Schengen
countries, and so the legality of the action could then
be scrutinized under the appropriate national law.)
The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) was
established in 1999 to help protect the financial
interests of the EU. The EU budget provides
considerable sums in financial support, and thus has
become a tempting target for fraud and cooperation
committed by individual offenders and organized
criminal groups.
OLAF is part of the Commission, but has been
granted the independent status required to carry out
investigations together with competent national
authorities. Its mandate is restricted to offences
directed against the financial interests of the EU,
but this still provides a wide ambit. In the prevention
of fraud, OLAF can carry out so-called internal
investigations (i.e. within EU structures) or, on the
basis of cooperation with national law enforcement
agencies, so-called external investigations. OLAF
can also cooperate with third countries on the basis
of special agreements.
Information gathering and analysis
Law enforcement authorities world-wide would be
among the first to agree that a more proactive,
intelligenceled approach is needed to detect and
interrupt organised criminal activities, apprehend the
offenders, demolish the criminal networks, and seize
and confiscate the proceeds of crime. Information
is needed on the profile, motives and modus
operandi of the offenders, the scope of and trends
in organised crime, the impact of organised crime
on society, and the effectiveness of the response to
organised crime. This information includes
operational data (data related to suspected
individuals and to detected cases) and empirical data
(qualitative and quantitative criminological data).
On the global level the arrangements for the
exchange of operational and empirical data continue
to be ad hoc, between individual law enforcement
agencies or even individuals. Such ad hoc
arrangements also raise concerns over whether or
not domestic legislation on data protection is being
followed. Implementation of the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
(in particular articles 27 and 28) should provide a
firmer foundation for this exchange of data, but
national practice will undoubtedly be slow in
aligning itself with the “soft” requirements of the
Convention, which allows for considerable national
discretion in implementation.
The Schengen information system has already been
mentioned above. Within the broader European
Union framework, several arrangements are already
in place for gathering and analysing data:
· a joint action adopted in 1996 deals with
the role of liaison officers. Their function
is specifically to focus on information
gathering. They are to “facilitate and
expedite the collection and exchange of
information though direct contacts with
law enforcement agencies and other
competent authorities in the host State”,
and “contribute to the collection and
exchange of information, particularly of
a strategic nature, which may be used for
the improved adjustment of measures” to
combat international crime, including
organized crime. So far, over 300 liaison
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officers have been posted by EU countries,
and they work in close cooperation with
one another.
· Europol has produced annual reports on
organised crime based on data provided
by Member States. These annual reports
have been used in an attempt to define
strategies. Over the years, the quality and
utility of these annual reports have
improved, even though continued work is
being done to improve the validity,
reliability and international comparability
of the data. One particular feature of the
annual reports is that they contain
recommendations based on an analysis of
the data. (As of 2006, these reports have
been presented in the form of threat
assessment reports.)
· various decisions have been taken on the
exchange of information on specific
subjects. For example, a decision adopted
in 1997 requires the exchange of
information between law enforcement
agencies when potentially dangerous
groups are travelling from one Member
State to another in order to participate in
events.
· the European Union has created a
number of financial programs to
encourage the closer involvement of the
academic and scientific world in the
analysis of organised crime.
· a European police research network is
being established to act as an information
source on research results, other
documented experiences and good
practice in crime control.
· on 20 December 2002, Europol and the
United States signed an agreement on the
exchange of personal data. This allows the
United States to benefit from the
operational and strategic analyses carried
out by Europol on the basis of data from
all European Union Member States.
Work in progress in police cooperation
At the end of 2004, the European Council adopted a
new program that calls for a number of new
measures. A key element is the adoption of what
has become known as the “principle of availability.”
This is defined to mean that a law enforcement
officer in one Member State who needs information
in order to perform his or her duties can obtain this
from another Member State, and that the law
enforcement agency in the other Member State
which holds this information should make it
available for the stated purpose, taking into account
the requirement of ongoing investigations in that
State. The first instruments implementing the
principle are now being drafted. The provision of
information would be hedged by some conditions,
including data protection.
Within the EU, this issue of data protection in police
cooperation has been seen to require a more general
approach. For this reason, a second initiative
launched during the spring of 2006 is designed to
result in a framework decision on the issue. Both
the European Council and the European Parliament
have given this work a relatively high priority, and
the framework decision should be ready towards the
end of 2006 or the beginning of 2007.
A third initiative, taken by a smaller group of
countries, is the so-called Prüm Convention. Signed
on 27 May 2005 by Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain
(and soon to be joined by Finland), it allows the law
enforcement authorities of the different countries to
have direct online access to one another’s databases,
compare DNA profiles and fingerprints, and
exchange the corresponding personal data.
Three initiatives are related to criminal records. The
one that is furthest along (as of the summer of 2006)
calls for the expedited transfer of criminal records
information on request. A second initiative derives
from a proposal that central European criminal
records be set up. This encountered such resistance
(for a variety of legal, practical and technical
reasons) that the proposal has been scaled down to
a model where a centralised data bank would contain
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information only on whether or not criminal records
exist regarding a specified individual who is not a
EU national in one of the EU countries; if so, the
authority requesting the information would turn to
the EU country in question. The third initiative deals
with the extent to which criminal records should be
taken into consideration in criminal proceedings
being conducted in another EU Member State.
3.3. Prosecutorial cooperation10
The global status quo:
International contacts between prosecutorial
authorities are based on bilateral and on the few
multilateral treaties on mutual legal assistance.
Informal contacts are facilitated by the International
Association of Prosecutors and other, similar non-
governmental organizations.
The European Union reality:
· a special structure, the European Judicial
Network, has been set up to promote direct
contacts between prosecutors. The system
involves computerized links between the
Member States, and in time will probably
allow automatic and direct translation and
transmission of requests.
· several European Union Member States
have posted liaison magistrates abroad,
with a specific mandate to facilitate
responses to requests for extradition,
EAWs and mutual legal assistance, and a
more general mandate to promote
international cooperation.
· prosecutorial and judicial co-operation
is promoted also by direct contacts through
the Schengen structures.
· an international structure, Eurojust, has
been set up to assist in the coordination of
the prosecution of serious and cross-
border cases.
The European Judicial Network and the
strengthening of informal contacts
Among the greatest difficulties in extradition and
mutual legal assistance is the lack of information
on how a request should be formulated so that it
can readily be dealt with in another country, and
the lack of information on what progress is being
made in the requested State in responding to the
request.
In those (rare) cases where the practitioner
personally knows his or her counterpart in the other
country, informal channels can be used. The
European Union has created a structure for fostering
direct contacts between practitioners, the “European
Judicial Network” (EJN).11 This network consists
primarily of the central authorities responsible for
international judicial cooperation in criminal
matters, and of the judicial or other competent
authorities with specific responsibilities within the
context of international cooperation. The EJN
focuses on promoting cooperation in respect of
serious crime such as organized crime, corruption,
drug trafficking and terrorism.
The EJN is promoting cooperation in a number of
different ways. First of all, it organizes regular
meetings (at least three times a year) of
representatives of the contact points. These meetings
have dealt, for example, with case studies, general
policy issues, and practical problems. Organizing
the meetings in the different EU Member States
provides an additional benefit: the host country can
present its system for international cooperation, and
the participants can get to know one another. Both
factors are important in instilling confidence in one
another’s criminal justice system.
Second, the EJN is preparing various tools for
practitioners. One such tool is a website and a CD-
rom that provide practitioners with information on
what types of assistance can be requested in the
different Member States (sequestration of assets,
electronic surveillance and so on) for what types of
11 Joint Action of 29 June 1998. A similar structure has been set up for cooperation in civil matters.
10 For systematic reasons, prosecutorial cooperation is here dealt with separately from judicial cooperation although most prosecutorial
cooperation in most Member States falls into the broader category of judicial cooperation.
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offences, how to request it, and whom to contact.
The website and the CD-rom also contain the texts
of relevant international instruments and national
legislation. A second tool is a computerized “atlas”
of the authorities in the different Member States,
which shows who is competent to do what in the
different Member States in relation to international
cooperation. In time, the contact points in all twenty-
five Member States will be connected with one
another by a secure computer link that can be used
not only to follow up on requests, but even to send
the requests themselves.
A third tool is a uniform model for requests for
mutual legal assistance. Consideration is currently
being given to developing a system for automatic
translation of these requests, at first into the major
European languages, and ultimately into the over
twenty languages used in the EU.
Liaison magistrates
The concept of the liaison magistrate is based on
the positive experiences with the growing network
of liaison officers used to promote cooperation
among law enforcement agencies. In law
enforcement, the liaison officer uses direct contacts
to facilitate and expedite the international collection
and exchange of information, in particular
information of a strategic nature.12
The liaison magistrate is an official with special
expertise in judicial co-operation who has been
posted in another State, on the basis of bilateral or
multilateral arrangements, in order to increase the
speed and effectiveness of judicial cooperation and
facilitate better mutual understanding between the
legal and judicial systems of the States in question.13
The liaison magistrate does not have any
extraterritorial powers, and also otherwise must fully
respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the host State.14
Liaison magistrates are — so far — used almost
solely by the European Union countries. In general,
liaison magistrates are sent to countries with which
there is a high number of requests for mutual
assistance, and where differences in legal systems
have caused delays. France has been the most active
in sending out liaison magistrates, and has sent them
not only to the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom, but
also outside the European Union, for example to
the United States.
Liaison magistrates work on the general level (by
promoting the exchange of information and statistics
and seeking to identify problems and possible
solutions) and on the individual level (by giving legal
and practical advice to authorities of their own State
and of the host State on how requests for mutual
assistance should best be formulated in order to
ensure a timely and proper response, and by trying
to identify contact persons who might help in
expediting matters). The exact profile of the work
of the liaison magistrate varies, depending on such
factors as the types of cases, and the extent to which
there are direct contacts between the judicial
authorities of the two States.
The advantages, from the point of view of the
sending State and the host State, are numerous.
Language problems are reduced, requests for judicial
co-operation can be discussed already before they
are sent in order to identify and avert possible
12 The Treaty of Amsterdam of the European Union (article 30(2)(d)) called on the European Council to “promote liaison arrangements
between prosecuting / investigating officials specialising in the fight against organised crime in close cooperation with Europol”. In order
to create a basis for the development of this work, on 22 April 1996 the European Council adopted a Joint Action on a framework for the
ex-change of liaison magistrates to improve judicial cooperation.
13 A related concept is that of the legal attaché, who is posted in the mission of the sending State to look after legal issues in general that
concern the host State and the sending State. Reference can also be made to temporary exchanges of personnel, which are designed to
increase familiarity with one another’s legal system and foster direct, informal contacts. Neither legal attachés nor personnel on temporary
exchange, however, have the same expertise and job profile as the liaison magistrate.
14 See, for example, P.B. Heymann, Two Models of National Attitudes Towards International Co-operation in Law Enforcement, Harvard
International Law Journal, vol. 31, p. 99, and Alastair Browne, Towards a Prosecutorial Model for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters?,
in Peter J. Cullen and William C. Gillmore (eds.), Crime sans Frontieres: International and European Legal Approaches, Hume Papers on
Public Policy, vol. 6, nos. 1 and 2, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1998.
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problems, and there is a basis for promoting trust
and confidence in one another’s legal system.
Eurojust: A formal structure for prosecutorial
coordination
Even the direct contacts and expertise provided by
the EJN and the liaison magistrates cannot always
provide the type of coordination needed in
investigating transnational organized crime. Over
recent years, the idea gradually evolved of setting
up a separate entity, somewhat comparable to
Europol in the law enforcement field, to coordinate
national prosecuting authorities and support
investigations of serious organised crime extending
into two or more Member States.15
The idea for the establishment of such an entity
received a considerable push at the special European
Union Council held in Tampere, Finland in October
1999. A temporary unit, called “Pro Eurojust” (short
for “Provisional Eurojust”) started work in Brussels
in March 2001, and Eurojust itself began its work
one year later. As of 1 January 2003, it has been
located in The Hague, near its police “cousin”,
Europol.
Each Member State has sent a senior prosecutor or
magistrate on permanent assignment to Eurojust.
These representatives work in The Hague and meet
every week to discuss both individual cases and
general policy for coordinating investigations.
Plenary meetings tend to be devoted to policy issues,
adopting administrative decisions and on reporting
on new cases, while most cases will be dealt with in
smaller meetings, among representatives of only the
individual countries involved. However, the College
of Eurojust has used its powers to recommend
centralisation of prosecutions in two cases during
2005, one involving the so-called Prestige case with
more than 3000 victims. Its recommendations were
followed.
Eurojust itself does not have any operational powers.
Instead, the national representatives, having agreed
on what needs to be done, contact the competent
authorities in their own Member State for the
required action. In addition, individual members of
Eurojust may have operational powers according to
their national legislation. One of the topics now
being debated is what type of operational powers
Eurojust itself should be given in the future. One
example is that Eurojust might be empowered to
ask a Member State to initiate criminal proceedings
or to decide on where prosecution should take place
in cases of conflicts of jurisdiction.
3.4. Judicial cooperation
The global status quo:
Mutual legal assistance and extradition are based
on an incomplete patchwork of bilateral treaties and,
in rare cases, multilateral treaties. These treaties tend
to cover only some offences, and offer only limited
measures. Requests must be sent through a central
authority. The procedure tends to be slow and
uncertain, with requests often being frustrated by
bureaucratic inertia, broad grounds for refusal, and
differences in criminal and procedural law.
The European Union reality:
· all European Union Member States are
parties to broad multilateral treaties on
mutual legal assistance and extradition.
· the European Union has agreed on
standards of good practice in mutual legal
assistance, and regularly reviews
compliance with these standards.
· separate European Union treaties on
mutual legal assistance and on extradition
(replaced by the EAW) have been drafted
in order to up-date and supplement the
existing multilateral treaties prepared
within the framework of the Council of
Europe.
· the European Union has begun moving
towards a system of mutual recognition
of decisions and judgments in criminal
matters. Such mutual recognition speeds
up cooperation considerably: a judicial
decision or judgment issued in any
Member State can be enforced as such in
any other Member State.
15 See Hans G. Nilsson, Eurojust – the Beginning or the End of the European Public Prosecutor? in Europarättslig Tidskrift, vol. 4, 2000.
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· the first steps in mutual recognition have
been taken with the adoption of the
framework decisions on, respectively, the
EU arrest warrant, the freezing of property
and evidence, and the enforcement of
fines.
· a mutual evaluation system has been
established, in which experts from
different countries assess the practical
conduct of international cooperation in
the target country.
Mutual legal assistance
The Member States of the European Union are all
parties to the 1959 Council of Europe Convention
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.
The 1959 Convention, however, was drafted almost
a half century ago. Since then, ideas regarding how
mutual assistance should be provided have changed
considerably, especially in Europe, where there has
been extensive experience in this sector. There has
been a clear trend towards simplifying and speeding
up mutual assistance by eliminating conditions and
grounds for refusals. Since the European Union
Member States have a lot of cases in common, they
have come to expect certain standards of conduct –
after all, if the central authority of one country is
itself slow or sloppy in responding to requests, it
can scarcely expect others to be better when
responding to its requests for assistance.
In 1998, the European Union adopted a set of
standards on good practice in mutual legal
assistance.16  Each Member State prepared a national
statement of good practice. These were then
circulated among all the Member States. The idea
here was that the Member States publicly commit
themselves to upholding these standards, and can
be held accountable.
The set of standards includes for example the
following points:
(a) acknowledging all urgent requests
and written enquiries unless a substantive
reply is sent quickly;
(b) when acknowledging requests and
inquiries, providing the name and contact
details of the authority (and, if possible,
the person) responsible for executing the
request;
(c) giving priority to requests which
have been marked “urgent”;
(d) where the assistance requested
cannot be provided in whole or in part,
providing an explanation and, where
possible, offering to discuss how the
difficulties might be overcome;
(e) where it appears that the assistance
cannot fully be provided within any
deadline set, and this will impair
proceedings in the requesting State,
advising the requesting State of this;
(f) submitting requests as soon as the
precise assistance that is needed has been
identified, and explaining the reasons for
marking a request as “urgent” or in setting
a deadline;
(g) ensuring that requests are
submitted in compliance with the relevant
treaty or arrangements; and
(h) when submitting requests,
providing the requested authorities with
the name and contact details of the
authority (and, if possible, the person)
responsible for issuing the request.
Although some of these points may seem trivial and
mundane, they all have an immediate impact on the
day-to-day work of judicial authorities involved in
international cases.
The European Union countries have prepared their
own Mutual Assistance Convention (adopted on 29
May 2000). This is not intended to be an independent
treaty, but instead supplements the 1959 Council of
Europe convention and its protocol. It brings these
earlier treaties up to date by reflecting not only the
emergence of the “good practice” referred to above,
but also the development of investigative techniques
and arrangements.
16 Joint Action of 29 June 1998 on good practice in mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.
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For example, the new European Union Convention
includes provisions that deal with:
- the sending of procedural documents
directly to the recipient in another State
(article 5);
- the sending of requests by telefax and e-
mail (article 6);
- the spontaneous exchange of information
(article 7);
- restitution of property to its rightful
owner (article 8);
- temporary transfer of persons held in
custody for purposes of investigation
(article 9);
- hearing by videoconference (article 10);
- hearing of witnesses and experts by
telephone conference (article 11);
- the use of controlled deliveries (article
12);
- the use of joint investigative teams
(article 13);
- the use of covert investigations (article
14);
- interception of telecommunications
(articles 17 to 22); and
- the protection of personal data provided
in response to a request (article 23).
In particular the provisions on the interception of
telecommunications are quite lengthy, and were the
subject of extensive debate. Different Member States
have different provisions on the conditions under
which the interception of telecommunications is
allowed. However, given the ease with which people
can now move from one country in the European
Union to another, and given also the ease with which
communications can be traced and listened to, this
presumably will become an increasingly important
issue, and the time spent on it was undoubtedly well
spent. The basic solution in this respect was to allow
interception, but to keep the authorities in the
countries in question informed.
The Convention brings in some other innovations.
Perhaps the most interesting one is that it reverses
one fundamental principle in mutual legal assistance.
Today, the almost universal rule is that the law
applicable to the execution of the request is that of
the requested State. The new Convention provides
that the requested State must comply with the
formalities and procedures expressly indicated by
the requesting Member State. The requested
Member State may refuse to do so only if compliance
would be contrary to the fundamental principles of
law of the requested State.
Extradition
Prior to 2004, extradition among the Member States
of the European Union was based largely on the 1957
Council of Europe Convention on Extradition. (In
addition, the five Nordic countries of Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have agreed
among themselves on identical legislation that
greatly simplifies extradition among these countries.
The Benelux countries had a separate Treaty from
1962.)
Also here, the Member States of the European Union
had sought to supplement the Council of Europe
Convention by drafting new treaty obligations. In
1995, the European Union adopted a Convention
on simplified extradition within the EU. Essentially,
the Convention focuses on the many cases where
the person in question consents to extradition. One
year later, in 1996, the European Union adopted a
Convention on the substantive requirements for
extradition within the European Union.
In October 1999, the European Union agreed on the
importance of mutual recognition of decisions and
judgments which, in its view, “should become the
cornerstone of judicial co-operation in both civil and
criminal matters within the Union.” The argument
was that already today, the Member States of the
European Union share fundamental values and legal
principles. The authorities of a Member State should
have full faith and confidence in the operation of
the legal system of the other states. Accordingly, it
should be made possible for a decision or judgment
handed down in one Member State to be
immediately enforced as such in any of the other
states.
The European Union further identified two priority
areas in criminal law where the principle of mutual
recognition should be applied, “fast track
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extradition” and pre-trial orders, in particular those
which would enable competent authorities quickly
to secure evidence and to seize assets which are
easily movable.
Work proceeded slowly. For a time, it seemed as if
work on mutual recognition would be buried by the
many legal, technical and practical problems
involved. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001
changed the situation dramatically, in that the
European Union decided that the draft “EU arrest
warrant” and a second draft decision on the freezing
of property and evidence should be completed by
December 2001. This political imperative
galvanized those officials responsible for hammering
out the details and reaching the necessary
compromises. Agreement on the EU arrest warrant
was indeed reached in December 2001; agreement
on the second decision came a few months later.
Prior to 9/11, work on the EU arrest warrant had
been slowed by the fact that it represented a
paradigm shift in extradition. Simply put, the new
decision (which entered into force on 1 January
2004) replaces extradition among the EU Member
States with a new system, whereby suspects and
convicted offenders are “surrendered” to the
requesting state. The process no longer needs to go
through the central authorities but has become purely
judicial. An arrest warrant issued by a court in one
state will be recognized as valid throughout the EU,
and is to be enforced by any and all national courts.
As a result, the terminology has changed: there are
no more requesting or requested States but “issuing”
and “executing” States. Moreover, the framework
decision also imposes a deadline of 60 days within
which an EAW must be decided (which may be
extended exceptionally by another 30 days) and a
deadline of 10 days for the actual surrender.
A European arrest warrant may be issued for offences
punishable under the law of the issuing Member
State by a custodial sentence or a detention order
for a maximum period of at least twelve months or,
where a sentence has been passed or a detention
order has been made, for at least four months. The
decision lists thirty-two offences which are outside
the scope of the condition of double criminality.
Thus, for these offences, the requested State cannot
refuse to extradite on the grounds that it does not
regard the act in question as a criminal offence. This
list may be expanded along with the passage of time.
For all other offences, the requested State may refuse
surrender on the grounds of the absence of double
criminality.
The requested person has the right to be informed
of the EU arrest warrant, of it contents and of the
possibility of expediting the procedure by consenting
to it. He or she has the right to legal counsel and, if
needed, an interpreter. If the requested person does
not consent to the surrender, he or she has the right
to be heard by the judicial authority in the requested
state. It should be noted that this hearing only
concerns the legality of the surrender. Any defence
against the actual charges on which the person is
wanted is to be made before the court in the issuing
state.
A person surrendered from one EU Member State
(A) to another (B) may be surrendered on to a third
EU Member State (C). The consent of state A is not
required if the requested person agrees to the
surrender, or if the rule of speciality referred to above
would not apply mutatis mutandis. In other cases,
the consent of state A is required. Obtaining this
consent follows more or less the same procedure as
with the original surrender from A to B; for example,
the same grounds for refusal apply.
If the surrender is to be made outside of the EU, the
consent of state A is always required. This consent,
in turn, is governed by the laws and agreements by
which state A is bound. Thus, for example if a person
is surrendered from France to the United Kingdom,
and the United States requests the extradition of this
person directly from the United Kingdom, the
consent of France will depend on her national law
and on the agreements existing between France and
the United States.
The decision on the EU arrest warrant has brought
about a significant change in both extradition law
and practice. It closely resembles the “fast-track
extradition” process that had been used between
Ireland and the United Kingdom, and (in an
experimental manner) between Italy and Spain. It
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has considerable potential for speeding up the
process, in particular since it will eliminate or reduce
a number of traditional grounds for refusal. Data
for 2005 suggest that the average time from request
to extradition / surrender has in fact been cut from
about nine months to less than two months. At least
1500 persons were surrendered in the EU during
2005 (statistics are still lacking from some Member
States).
As with all major changes, the EU arrest warrant
has also given rise to various concerns. Some persons
are concerned that it may in practice hamper the
rights of the defence, since when a person is taken
into custody for surrender, he or she can contest only
the surrender in the requested state. Any pleas against
the actual charges would have to be presented in a
foreign court. Other persons are concerned that the
extensive curtailment of the condition of double
criminality will lead to cases where a person must
be surrendered to another Member State even if the
act in question would not have been an offence if
committed in the requested state. (However, in this
respect the decision is subject to a limited principle
of territoriality.) Yet other persons have noted that
the relatively short time limits set down in the
decision may prove quite difficult to observe in
practice. This concern is associated with the fact
that the decisions will now be made by individual
courts, and not by the central authority. Clearly, a
lot of work has been needed to inform judges and
court personnel on how the process should be put
into place.
Perhaps the greatest cause for concern is that the
decision was pushed through the drafting process in
record time, to meet political imperatives in the wake
of the terrorist attacks in the United States. Usually,
drafting work of this nature can extend over several
years, allowing for example for extensive
consultation with national Parliaments, and for fairly
leisurely reflection in each of the Member States on
what the implications of various options would be.
Short-circuiting this process of consultation and
reflection may, conceivably, have led to a decision
that will lead to considerable difficulties in practice.
(In fact, in at least Germany, Poland and Cyprus,
the national laws that put the EU arrest warrant into
effect met with serious constitutional challenges.)
Once sufficient experience has been gained with the
EU arrest warrant, more drafting work may prove
to be needed to smooth out the rough edges.
Mutual recognition of decisions and judgments
As was noted above in connection with the
presentation of the EU arrest warrant, mutual
recognition of decisions and judgments has
traditionally been almost non-existent in
international cooperation. Because of jurisdictional
limits (and undoubtedly also because of a deep-
rooted lack of confidence in the criminal justice
systems of other countries), the almost iron-clad rule
is that court decisions and judgments cannot be
directly enforced abroad. For example, if a court in
one country orders that a suspect be arrested, that
his or her assets be frozen, or that his or her house
be searched for evidence, the authorities of that
country have to use mutual legal assistance in order
to request that the decision be carried out abroad.
The process inevitably takes some time – time during
which the suspect can empty out his or her bank
accounts and move on to a third country, escaping
the administration of justice.
So far, relatively little attention has been paid to
recognising the validity of a decision taken by a
foreign authority or court, and enforcing it as such.
This principle of mutual recognition would enable
competent authorities to quickly secure evidence,
seize assets and immobilize offenders. This would,
of course, also be in the interests of the victim.17
There are few bilateral or multilateral treaties on
this topic. One of the few is the European
Convention on the International Validity of Criminal
Judgments, prepared within the framework of the
Council of Europe in 1970. Even this treaty has very
17 Protecting the interests of the victim is one of the priorities of the European Union. On 15 March 2001, a framework decision was
adopted in order to ensure uniform minimum legal protections for victims in criminal proceedings. A Council Directive was adopted on
24 April 2004 on unification of compensation to victims from the State.
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few signatories, and even fewer ratifications.18
Indeed, even most EU Member States have not
ratified it, and so it has very little practical
importance. Furthermore, the Convention only
applies to legally final judgments, and not for
example to decisions made in the course of an
investigation.19
With the increasing integration of Europe, and as
shown with the example of the EU arrest warrant,
the EU Member States are now moving towards
mutual recognition of decisions and judgments. It
is widely regarded as an effective and indeed almost
unavoidable tool in cooperation. Furthermore,
proponents argue that the close ties among the EU
countries, and the fact that they are all signatories
to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, has
lead to a situation in which all Member States should
have full faith and confidence in the operation of
the criminal justice system in one another’s country.
To give an example, if a judge in one country orders
that a suspect should be arrested, courts in all other
European Union countries should have confidence
that the decision was made according to law and
with due respect to human rights.20
In the view of the Tampere European Council in
October 1999, mutual recognition should become
the cornerstone of judicial co-operation in both civil
and criminal matters within the European Union.
The EU arrest warrant, described above, is the prime
example that can be given of mutual recognition. A
second framework decision was adopted soon
afterwards (on 28 February 2002), on the mutual
recognition of decisions on the freezing of property
and evidence. The framework decision makes it
possible, for example, for the decision of a court in
one Member State on the freezing of the accounts
of a suspect to be enforced immediately in any and
all of the other Member States. On 14 February 2005,
a third framework decision on mutual recognition
was adopted, this time on financial penalties. A few
days later, on 24 February 2005, a fourth framework
decision was adopted, this time on confiscation
orders.
Work in progress on judicial cooperation
A fourth decision on mutual recognition is expected
before the end of 2006: on 1 June 2006, the Council
reached political agreement on what is known as a
“European evidence warrant.” As soon as a few
national Parliaments give their approval to the
decision, it will be formally adopted. On the basis
of a European evidence warrant, a court can request
objects, documents or data that are available in any
of the other Member States. (However, the EEW
cannot at this stage be used to obtain for example
testimony from a witness in another Member State.
This and other issues will be dealt with in a second
negotiation stage of the process.)
In November 2004, the heads of State of the EU
countries adopted an updated program on progress
in justice and home affairs. In respect of mutual
recognition, they ordered that work should proceed
on instruments related, respectively, to the gathering
and admissibility of evidence, conflicts of
jurisdiction and the ne bis in idem principle, and the
execution of final sentences of imprisonment or
other (alternative) sanctions. In addition, work is
underway on an instrument dealing with pre-trial
release and supervision of suspects, and on ensuring
that persons guilty of specific offences against
children are barred from jobs that would place them
in contact with children.
20 As noted earlier, an analogy can be made with the “full faith and credit” doctrine contained in article IV, section 1 of the Constitution of
the United States. According to this section, “Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records and judicial
18 Of the 25 EU Member States, only Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden have ratified
the 1970 Convention as of August 2006. An additional seven EU countries have signed, but not yet ratified, the Convention.
19 There is one further exception to the lack of mutual recognition internationally. The five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway and Sweden) recognize one another’s decisions and judgments, and refusals are almost unheard of. This system is based on the
fact that the Nordic countries share very much the same legal system, and also otherwise have long-standing cooperation with one
another.
proceedings of every other State.”
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3.5. Mutual evaluations
Over the years, the Member States of the European
Union have made a number of commitments to
improving their response to organized crime, and to
improving international cooperation. These
commitments were undoubtedly made in good faith,
and with all intention to implement them in full.
However, the practical reality of investigation,
prosecution and adjudication (for example, lack of
resources, and differences in priorities in different
sectors and on different levels) can mean that the
work that is actually carried out remains at odds with
the commitments.
One way to identify what problems exist is to carry
out expert reviews. The OECD has instituted a
system of mutual evaluation of Member States on
measures taken to prevent and control money
laundering. These evaluations are carried out by
teams of experts from different countries who,
because of their background, are able to talk as
colleagues with experts and practitioners in the target
country, ask the right questions and place the answers
that they are given into the proper context. This
approach has been deemed so successful that the
European Union has adopted it on a broader scale.
Accordingly, on 5 December 1997 the European
Union decided to use this mutual evaluation to see
how the Member States implement their
commitments to respond to organized crime.
Following the OECD model, small international
teams of experts visit the target country, interview
practitioners, report on their assessment and make
recommendations. The assessment is confidential,21
and the target country is given many opportunities
to respond to any criticism made.
So far, two rounds of evaluations have been carried
out in all Member States. The first round dealt with
mutual legal assistance and urgent requests for the
tracing and restraint of property, and the second
round dealt with law enforcement and its role in the
fight against drug trafficking. A third round dealing
with the exchange of information inside and between
Member States and with Europol, is nearing
completion during the summer of 2006 and a fourth
round on the EAW has begun in 2006.
The Member States have been quite satisfied with
the way in which the mutual evaluations have been
carried out. The process has not only contributed to
greater understanding of the differences that exist
between the countries, but has also resulted in many
changes in law and practice.
In October 2002, the European Union adopted a
similar mutual evaluation mechanism to be used in
respect of anti-terrorism measures. This mechanism
relies primarily on written responses from the
Member States to specific questions, to be followed
up if necessary by on-site visits by experts.
At the end of June 2006, the Commission presented
a proposal for an evaluation mechanism that would
apply far more broadly to the adoption of EU
measures and their implementation on the national
level, not just in respect of organized crime, but in
all other justice and home affairs sectors as well.
The relation between the proposed mechanism and
already existing evaluation mechanisms – such as
the mutual evaluation mechanism just described –
remains to be worked out.
3.6.  Cooperation in the formulation of
domestic law and policy
The global status quo:
International cooperation on the formulation of
domestic law and policy is almost entirely limited
to general provisions in bilateral and multilateral
treaties, and to even more general recommendations,
resolutions and declarations.
The European Union reality:
· the European Union has adopted binding
decisions calling for criminalization of a
number of offences. The definitions are
generally rather tightly drawn, and have
21 With the permission of the country in question, the report can be published. Indeed, so far all of the reports on mutual assistance have
in fact been published. The second and the third round, on law enforcement issues, remain confidential because of the sensitivity of the
subjects.
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forced countries to amend their legislation
accordingly.
· the European Union has begun
cooperation in the prevention of crime,
including organized crime.
· the European Union has adopted a
number of action plans and programs that
have had a clear effect on policy and
practice in all the Member States.
· there are signs that the European Union
may be moving towards “communitizing”
criminal law, in other words to a situation
where, instead of each individual Member
State determining the contents of its
criminal law and criminal procedure, the
decision is taken by all twenty-five
Member States working together.
Criminal law and criminal procedure
On the global level, in the area of criminal law and
criminal procedure, very little international
cooperation exists. Where it does exist, it primarily
concerns the very few substantive provisions in
bilateral and multilateral treaties, such as the
minimum definitions of participation in a criminal
organization, corruption, money laundering and
obstruction of justice in the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
There are also a number of resolutions,
recommendations and declarations regarding
criminal law and criminal justice, but these have
tended to have little actual impact on law, practice
and policy.
This is not the case with the European Union, where
not only is there extensive discussion about the
harmonisation of both criminal and procedural law,
but much has been done in practice.22  Among the
issues that have already been dealt with are the
following (this list is not exhaustive):
Fraud and counterfeiting
- fraud and other crimes against the
financial interests of the Communities
(Convention of 26 July 1995, protocols of
27 September 1996 and 19 June 1997)23
- fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash
means of payment (framework decision
on 28 May 2001)
- counterfeiting of the euro (framework
decisions on 29 May 2000, 6 December
2001 and a Decision on 6 December 2001)
Drug trafficking
- illicit cultivation and production of drugs
(Council resolution of 22 November 1996)
- “drug tourism” (Council resolution of 22
November 1996)
- sentencing for serious illicit drug
trafficking (Council resolution of 6
December 1996)
- drug addiction and drug trafficking (joint
action of 9 December 1996)24
- drug trafficking (framework decision on
25 October 2004)
Trafficking in persons and related offences
- trafficking in human beings and sexual
exploitation of children (joint action of 21
January 1997)
- trafficking in human beings (framework
decision on 19 July 2002 and Directive
on 28 November 2002)
- combating the sexual exploitation of
children and child pornography
(framework decision of 22 December
2003)
- initiatives to combat trafficking in human
beings, in particular women (Council
resolution of 20 October 2003)
- combating illegal immigration (Council
recommendation of 22 December 1995)
22 The EU debate on harmonisation is discussed in greater detail below, in section 4.
23 In May 2001, the Commission proposed a Directive which would amalgamate the various Convention provisions relating to fraud
against the financial interests of the EU. This proposal has not been followed through.
24 A “joint action” has been replaced by framework decisions in the Amsterdam Treaty.
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Corruption
- corruption (Convention signed on 26
May 1997)
- corruption in the private sector (joint
action of 22 December 1998, and
framework decision of 22 July 2003)
Other offences
- racism and xenophobia (joint action of
15 July 1996)
- football hooliganism (Council resolution
of 28 May 1997)
- money laundering (joint action of 3
December 1998, framework decision 26
June 2001)
- arms trafficking (Council
recommendation of 7 December 1998)
- participation in a criminal organization
(joint action of 21 December 1998;
supplemented by a framework decision on
which agreement was reached in April
2006)
- combating terrorism (framework
decision of 13 June 2002)
- protection of the environment through
criminal law (framework decision of 27
January 2003)
- attacks against information systems
(framework decision on 24 February 2005
- ship-source pollution (framework
decision on 12 July 2005 and Directive
on 7 September 2005)
Procedural issues
- interception of telecommunications
(Council resolution of 17 January 1995
and Article 13 of the 2000 MLA
Convention)
- protection of witnesses in the fight
against international organized crime
(Council resolution of 23 November 1995)
- individuals who cooperate with the
judicial process in the fight against
international organised crime (Council
resolution of 20 December 1996)
- cooperation between financial
intelligence units (Decision on 17 October
2000)
- widening the scope of confiscation
(framework decision on 24 February
2005)
- the investigation and prosecution of
genocide, crimes against humanity and
war crimes (Council decision of 8 May
2003)
- treaties on extradition and mutual legal
assistance with USA; treaties with
Norway and Iceland on mutual legal
assistance and on an arrest warrant
- setting up of joint investigative teams
(framework decision on 13 June 2002;
Recommendation on a model agreement
on 8 May 2003)
- freezing orders (framework decision 22
July 2003
Work in progress
With the current focus on mutual recognition in the
European Union, there are fewer initiatives on
further harmonisation of criminal and procedural
law. Work continues to be underway on the minimum
provisions on the constituent elements of offences
and penalties relating racism and xenophobia. This
project had ground to a halt during the spring of
2003, largely over the concerns of some countries
over the freedom of speech. An attempt to resuscitate
the work was made at the beginning of 2005, but
with little more success. A new effort has been
launched during the spring of 2006.
The Commission has advanced various proposals
for further harmonisation of substantive criminal
law, for example in respect of tax offences; violation
of intellectual property rights; and the penalties for
counterfeiting offences. A considerable amount of
attention has also been focused on money
laundering, and on the freezing of the assets of
offenders. For example, a framework decision on
money laundering and on the identification, tracing,
freezing or seizure, and confiscation of the
instrumentalities and proceeds of crime was adopted
on 26 June 2001, and the Commission is preparing
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a further proposal on cash payments and money
laundering.
A major project has to do with the procedural rights
of suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings.
Essentially, this project has sought to define what
the minimum rights of the defence are. The
discussions have revealed that, although all EU
Member States are signatories to the European
Human Rights Convention, there are still
considerable areas of disagreement as to specific
rights. As of the spring of 2006, the future of the
project is very much in doubt. A strong minority of
Member States has taken the view that the proposal
would not provide any added value, and indeed may
in time result in a weakening of some of the rights
of suspects and defendants.
The prevention of organized crime
Organised crime, just as is the case with crime in
general, does not spread at random. It is often a
planned and deliberate activity. Accordingly, it
depends to a great deal on the presence of motivated
offenders, on the existence of the opportunity for
crime, and on the orienta-tion of the work of those
who try to prevent and respond to organised crime.
In line with this so-called situational approach, the
Member States are exploring ways to ensure that
the commission of crime is made more difficult, that
committing crime involves greater risks to the
offender (in particular the risk of detection and
apprehension), and that the possible benefits to the
offender of committing crime are decreased or
eliminated.
Also the Tampere European Council stressed the
importance of crime prevention. It suggested that
common crime prevention priorities should be
developed and identified. Elements for an emerging
crime prevention policy are contained in the Council
resolution of 21 December 1998 on the prevention
of organised crime. In March 2001, the Commission
and Europol presented a report on a European
strategy on the prevention of organised crime.
One further step in developing and identifying
priorities was made on 15 March 2001, when the
European Union decided on the establishment of a
crime prevention network. This network consists of
contact points in each Member State, representing
not only the authorities but also civil society, the
business community and researchers. The network
functions by organizing meetings, compiling a
database and otherwise by seeking to gather and
analyse data on effective crime prevention measures
on the local and regional level in order to disseminate
information on “good practices.” At the summit held
in November 2004, the heads of State agreed that
the European Crime Prevention Network should be
further strengthened and professionalised.
European Union policies and programs
On 16-17 June 1997, the European Union adopted
a Plan of Action to combat organised crime. Instead
of the resolutions, recommendations and
declarations that have so often been adopted in other
fora - regrettably often with little practical impact -
the European Union decided, for the first time
anywhere, on specific action, with a clear division
of responsibilities, a clear timetable and a
mechanism for implementing the action plan. The
strong consensus reached by Member States on the
1997 Plan of Action helped to create the political
and professional climate required on both the EU
level and the national level to take and implement
the necessary decisions.
The 1997 Plan of Action changed the rate of the
evolution of international cooperation against
organized crime. Examples of the progress that has
been achieved are the mutual evaluation mechanism,
the entry into force of the Europol Convention, the
establishment of the European Judicial Network,
criminalization of participation in a criminal
organisation, the establishment of a variety of funds
to support specific measures, the adoption of joint
actions on money laundering, asset tracing, and good
practices in mutual assistance, the pre-accession pact
with the candidate countries, and the identification
of further measures in respect of the prevention of
organised crime.
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The period allotted for the 1997 Plan of Action ended
on 31 December 1999. A follow-up plan was adopted
in March 2000.25 Specific forms of crime that are
the focus include economic crime, money laundering
and off-shore centres, terrorism, computer crime,
and urban crime and youth crime.
At the same time, broader strategies for dealing with
justice and home affairs were being developed.
When Finland held the Presidency of the European
Union during the second half of 1999, the Tampere
European Council (15-16 October 1999), adopted a
set of priorities not only in the response to cross-
border crime, but also in respect of migration and
asylum issues.
Five years down the road, these various priorities –
known in the European Union as the “Tampere
milestones” – have been replaced by an updated and
quite ambitious program adopted by the heads of
State in November 2004.
Among the points stressed in the November 2004
program are the following:
· the sharing of information among law
enforcement and judicial authorities
(while maintaining the proper balance
between privacy and security);
· establishment of a coherent overall
approach to combat terrorism;
· strengthening the prevention of organised
crime;
· strengthening the tools to address the
financial aspects of organised crime;
· improving general crime prevention;
· creating a “European judicial culture”;
and
· promoting the principle of mutual
recognition of judicial decisions.
At the time of this writing, August 2006, Finland
again holds the Presidency, and is working closely
together with the Commission in preparing a review
of the implementation of the Hague Programme. At
the end of June 2006, the Commission issued a
“Scoreboard Plus” report on implementation, as well
as proposals for how implementation can be made
more effective in key areas of the Hague Programme.
The goal is the identification of which priority areas
in the Hague Programme are particularly behind in
terms of implementation, and therefore require an
added political push by the European Council.
Cooperation with candidate countries and other
third countries
Even if all the European Union Member States could
effectively develop their laws and systems to prevent
and control organized crime within their borders,
this would not be enough. Preventing and controlling
organised crime requires broader, global co-
operation.
One particular focus within the EU is cooperation
with the so-called candidate countries. For several
years in advance of the mammoth enlargement of
the European Union in May 2004, the EU negotiated
actively with the then ten “candidate countries.” The
infusion of extensive technical assistance and
millions of euros, combined with the strong political
pressure exerted from within and from without these
countries, resulted in the ten countries being able to
carry out an extensive reform process in a
remarkably short time.
This same process is now underway with Bulgaria
and Romania (both seeking to join the EU in 2007)
as well as Croatia, FYROM (Macedonia) and
Turkey. Other countries, including Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia, have already indicated their
interest in becoming members, and may thus soon
be brought within the scope of this cooperation.
In this process, considerable attention is being paid
to the prevention and control of organized crime.
The European Union has already adopted a large
number of measures (referred to as the acquis
communautaire), and the Member States have
implemented them in their domestic legislation and
practice. In order to avoid a situation where
25 The new plan of action is known as “The Prevention and Control of Organised Crime: A European Union Strategy for the beginning of
the new Millennium.”
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organized criminal groups take advantage of a
sudden expansion of the European Union, also the
candidate countries must fully accept and implement
the acquis.
A second focus for the EU is the Russian Federation.
In 1999, a special European Union Action Plan was
prepared on common action with the Russian
Federation on combating organized crime. This in
essence sets up a structure and process for
continuous consultations and cooperation between
the European Union and the Russian Federation. In
addition, there is a broader “partnership” agreement
with the Russian Federation (and with Ukraine) that
provides a basis for cooperation and a broad
agreement to set up a “common space” between
Russia and the EU.
Other geographical areas with which the European
Union is seeking to strengthen co-operation include
the Mediterranean, South Eastern Europe, China,
North America, Latin America and the Caribbean.
In December 2005, the Council decided to take a
more proactive approach to its external relations in
justice and home affairs. The decision identified a
number of ways in which the EU would work with
partners on a range of issues. At the same time, it
was decided that the EU should from time to time
focus on certain regions and certain issues. To start
with, these points of focus would include
Afghanistan and drugs, the Western Balkans and
organized crime, Northern Africa and illegal
immigration, and Northern Africa and counter-
terrorism. Russia is also to be given a special focus
in this manner.
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United
States (and the response to the threat of terrorism)
understandably enough became a top priority. This
could be seen in the broad range of co-operative
measures put into place, ranging from cooperation
between the US authorities and Europol, to the very
rapid negotiation of agreements on extradition and
mutual legal assistance between the EU and the US.
These agreements were significant in several
respects. They were specifically between the United
States and the European Union, and not between
the United States and the (then) fifteen Member
States of the EU. To a large extent, they brought up
to date the bilateral agreements that the US had with
the European countries.
The European Union is also active in working
through intergovernmental organizations such as the
Council of Europe and the United Nations. For
example, throughout the negotiations on the United
Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime and on the United Nations
Convention on Corruption, the European Union
countries worked very closely together in seeking
to ensure that the resulting Convention was as
effective and broad as possible.
4. The second claim: “European
Union cooperation in criminal justice
is an attempt to create a unified
criminal justice system, with its own
criminal and procedural law”
The concepts of harmonisation and
approximation
The question of how far the criminal law and
procedural law of the Member States of the European
Union should be harmonised has long been a subject
of considerable controversy. Everyone appears to
agree that some degree of harmonisation is necessary
in order to ensure smooth international cooperation,
as long as by “harmonisation” one means the
approximation or co-ordination of different legal
provisions or systems by eliminating major
differences and creating minimum requirements or
standards. To use a musical analogy, each Member
State can continue to play its own national music,
as long as it is in harmony with the music of the
other twenty-four Member States, and meets a
certain standard of quality.
Everyone also appears to agree that, at least at this
stage, we are not talking about the unification of
criminal and procedural law within the European
Union, in the sense that the twenty-five distinct legal
systems would be replaced by one system. To use
the musical analogy, no one supports the idea of
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replacing the orchestra with a single synthesizer, no
matter how technically advanced.
A number of arguments can be presented in support
of the harmonisation or approximation of European
criminal and procedural law. All of Europe can be
said to share cultural values to the extent that the
different countries can and should share the same
laws. The approximation of laws would simplify the
application of law, since more or less the same laws
would apply throughout the European Union. This
would reduce the number of cases (usually
admittedly marginal, but at times serious) where one
Member State refuses to extradite or provide mutual
legal assistance to another Member State, on the
grounds of the absence of double criminality.26 The
approximation of laws would also encourage all the
Member States of the EU to assign more or less the
same priority to the detection and prosecution of
different offences, thus decreasing the risk of a
situation where one country does not take
sufficiently vigorous steps to detect and prosecute
(for example) fraud against the European Union.
Furthermore, if all countries would apply more or
less the same criminal and procedural laws, this
would help in fostering mutual trust and cooperation
among courts and other judicial authorities, thus
strengthening the basis for the mutual recognition
of judgments and other judicial decisions.
At the very least, according to this line of argument,
the Member States should be able to agree on the
criminalisation at least of the most serious offences
(even if the precise definitions vary from one country
to the next). And surely with the European Human
Rights Convention in force throughout Europe, the
Member States should be able to agree on the core
of protections under procedural law: the inviolability
of the person, the protection against self-
incrimination, the right to be informed of the charges
against oneself, the right to a proper defence, and so
on (even if the way in which these rights are ensured
varies from one country to the next).
Those who criticize efforts at approximation within
the European Union are often answered that they
are fighting a paper tiger. According to this line of
response, no one is seeking full harmonisation of
criminal and procedural law. Instead, only a basic
level of harmonisation is sought for two main
purposes: in order to ensure that all Member States
criminalize the more serious offences (in particular,
serious cross-border offences), and in order to
support mutual recognition of judgments. Here, an
analogy can be made with the United States, where
there is both federal and state legislation. Criminal
law on the federal level focuses on activity that has
cross-border implications. Each state can and does
legislate on other criminal acts.
Proposals to increase the extent of approximation
The Tampere programme adopted in 1999 was
relatively clear in stating that mutual recognition is
the cornerstone of judicial cooperation (in both
criminal and civil matters). However, the Tampere
programme also refers to “the necessary
approximation of legislation” (paragraph 37).27
What is “necessary” appears to be a matter of
dispute.
This dispute has been evident for almost the entire
period that the EU has been cooperating in justice
and home affairs. The dispute has been perhaps the
most heated in connection with the need to protect
the financial interests of the European Union, for
example against subsidy fraud, embezzlement and
corruption. In 1997, a group of experts presented
the results of the so-called “Corpus Juris” project.28
Briefly, they proposed not only harmonisation of the
definition of offences against the financial interests
of the European Union, but also the establishment
of a European Public Prosecutor system, using
identical procedural law provisions in each Member
State. What they proposed was, essentially, the
26  The requirement of double criminality is strongly entrenched in international cooperation in criminal matters. In essence, it means that
country A will not provide assistance or extradite a suspect to country B for an offence, unless this is an offence also in country A.
27 Along much the same lines, the Hague programme (which followed the Tampere programme) states that the approximation of substantive
criminal law facilitates mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters
having a cross-border dimension (section 3.3.2.).
28 See http://www.law.uu.nl/wiarda/corpus/engelsdx.html. The project was first presented on 17-18 April 1997.
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creation of a European criminal and procedural law:
the European Public Prosecutor would apply exactly
the same criminal law, following exactly the same
procedure, no matter whether he or she was
preparing a prosecution in Ireland or Italy, in Spain
or Sweden.
Proponents have said that this degree of uniformity
is necessary in order to prevent organized criminal
groups from utilising differences between the
Member States. Critics, in turn, see this as the first
step on the road to a very extensive European
criminal and procedural law, distinct from the
national criminal and procedural laws.
The Corpus Juris project did not lead to legislative
action. The Commission returned to the matter by
issuing a “Green Paper” on the proposal for a
European Public Prosecutor.
The disagreement emerged once again when the new
Constitutional Treaty was being drafted in 2002 and
2003. The critics of harmonisation succeeded in
preventing language that would have specifically
called for the creation of a European Public
Prosecutor, but the proponents succeeded in getting
at least a reference to it in the Constitution, as an
idea that is to be reconsidered when the
Constitutional Treaty enters into force.
The impact of changes in EU decision-making 1:
decision C-176/03
The European Public Prosecutor project raises
broader issues of how far the approximation of
criminal and procedural law can go, and who can
make the decisions. Questions of criminal law have
so far always been reserved to the Member States
themselves to decide, on the basis of consensus.
Article 34 of the Treaty of Amsterdam gave the
Commission a right of initiative in these matters and
Article 31 (e) specified that initiatives on
approximation could include organised crime,
terrorism and organised crime. Article 47 of the
Treaty provides that the first pillar takes precedence
over the third pillar. The exact implication of article
47, however, has been questioned. Most Member
States have been of the view that the Commission is
limited to the right of initiative and that the
Community may not adopt decisions on criminal
law, and only the Member States themselves may
make any decision on criminalization. However, a
minority – and the Commission – have been of the
view that article 47 in effect gives the Community
the right to oblige Member States to adopt
criminalisations on certain issues, if criminal law
sanctions are the only way to protect core
Community interests.
For several years, an uneasy working compromise
had been used: decisions under article 31(e) were
made in tandem, with the Community taking
decisions on matters within its power, and the
Member States (through the Council) taking
decisions at the same time on matters that they
deemed within their powers.29
The basis for this working compromise came to a
jolting end on 13 September 2005, when the
European Court of Justice issued a long-awaited
ruling. On 19 December 2002, the Council had
adopted a framework decision on the protection of
the environment through criminal law. The
Commission has argued that the Council had no right
to take such a decision, since environmental matters
clearly belong under the first pillar, where the
Commission has the sole right of initiative and the
Community (through the Council) ( together with
Parliament) has the right of decision. The Council,
in turn, unanimously decided that criminal law
matters – even when related to what would otherwise
be a first pillar matter – belong under the third pillar
and are thus in the competence solely of the Council.
When the Council took this decision, the
Commission brought the case to the European Court
of Justice.
In its decision C-176/03, the European Court
essentially ruled that under certain conditions,
provisions relevant to the protection of the
environment through criminal law could and indeed
should be taken under the first pillar. The reasoning
of the Court, however, was narrow enough to lead
to considerable disagreement between the
Commission and the Council as to what, exactly,
29 To complicate measures, the Constitutional Treaty – when and if it enters into force – gives the Commission greater powers of initiative,
and in practice puts an end to the requirement that Council decisions on home and justice affairs must always be made by consensus.
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the Court had decided. While there was agreement
that the original framework decision on the
protection of the environment through criminal law
had to be revisited, there was no agreement as to
whether this was true of Council decisions taken in
other areas. Apparently, conclusions will have to
await further decisions of the Court on parallel cases.
In the mean time, the Commission has identified a
number of decisions given in the third pillar which
in its view should have been given in the first pillar.
It is currently preparing the corresponding proposals.
It has already amended its proposal, at the time under
consideration by the Council, for a first pillar
directive and a third pillar framework decision on
the protection of industrial property rights, and
replaced it with a proposal for a first pillar directive.
The impact of changes in EU decision-making 2:
difficulties in negotiation and implementation
At present, the debate between the proponents and
critics of far-reaching harmonisation has entered into
a new stage. This is only partly a result of the
European Court decision referred to above, a
decision which appears to give the Commission –
long a supporter of approximation in tandem with
mutual recognition – more leverage in presenting
new proposals. Two other developments need to be
mentioned: the difficulties encountered in
negotiating and implementing new decisions on
mutual recognition, and a proposal to transfer
matters from the third pillar to the first pillar.
Even though mutual recognition has been accepted
as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation, this does
not mean that all Member States are as enthusiastic
about expanding the scope of mutual recognition. It
took the horror of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to get
the EU to agree on the very first decision on mutual
recognition, the EU arrest warrant. That decision
was ultimately pushed through in three months, a
remarkably short period – especially given the fact
that the decision marked a shift in paradigm in
international cooperation in criminal justice. The
next decision, on the freezing of property and
evidence, came soon afterwards.
Since then, however, the pace of negotiation appears
to have slowed down considerably, even though
several mutual recognition topics remained to be
dealt with, among them the transfer of prisoners,
community-based sanctions, pre-trial release and the
supervision of suspects, disqualifications and loss
of rights, and the principle of ne bis in idem (double
jeopardy). Deadlines established in the Hague
Programme have not been met. For example, a
decision concerning disqualifications (in particular
in connection with sexual offences against children)
was to be taken by the end of 2005. However, this
proposal is still being negotiated, and quite possibly
will continue to be under negotiation for a
considerable time to come.
Two factors in particular appear to have contributed
to this appreciable slowing in the pace of
development, enlargement, and difficulties
encountered by some Member States in the
implementation of decisions.
On 1 May 2005, the European Union expanded by
taking in ten new Member States. These ten states
had done considerable work to ensure that their law
and practice was in accord with the acquis
communautaire. There thus should be no doubt as
to the commitment of the new Member States to
continue to work on priority issues.
Nonetheless, the expansion can be argued to have
complicated negotiations over new instruments.
From the simple logistical point of view, presenting
and considering twenty-five positions takes more
time than presenting and considering fifteen
positions. Even more importantly, each of the
twenty-five has its own domestic legal and
administrative systems, laws, practice and interests,
and this will be reflected in their approach to the
negotiations.
The second factor is difficulties in implementation.
There has been increased external and internal
criticism of the way Member States have
implemented EU decisions. The Commission has
become more rigorous in assessing the transposition
of EU instruments. For example, it has faulted the
way in which several Member States have
implemented the 2002 framework decision on the
European Arrest Warrant, by not bringing the
decision into force on time, by inappropriately
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adding grounds for refusal, by turning facultative
grounds of refusal into absolute grounds for refusal,
and so on. Domestically, the Constitutional Court
of Germany has struck down the German law by
which the European Arrest Warrant was brought into
force within Germany, on the grounds that the law
was unconstitutional by requiring the surrender of
German nationals to other EU Member States unless
certain conditions (allowed for by the framework
decision but not implemented by Germany) were
fulfilled. Germany has since then amended its law.
(Corresponding difficulties were encountered in
Poland and Cyprus, which now have decided to
amend their constitutions in conformity with the
framework decision.)
Another example of difficulties in implementation
is the framework decision on the freezing of property
and evidence. The decision was to have been
implemented in all Member States by August 2005.
One year later, however, less than half of the Member
States have in fact brought it into force.
As a result of these difficulties, the negotiators of
several Member States may well have become more
critical regarding how instruments are formulated.
At times, it almost seems as if negotiators have
implicit instructions not to allow any EU instruments
that would require extensive changes in law and
practice in one’s own country.
The impact of changes in EU decision-making 3:
transfer from the third pillar to the first pillar?
As noted above, a third development that has led to
a new stage in the debate between the proponents
and critics of far-reaching harmonisation – alongside
of the European Court decision of 13 September
2005, and the growing difficulties in developing new
instruments on mutual recognition – is a proposal
to transfer matters from the third pillar to the first
pillar.
As described in section 2 above, decisions in the
third pillar are made by the twenty-five Member
States acting together in Council, after consulting
the European Parliament and on the basis of
unanimity. If even one Member State disagrees, no
decision is possible. This has inevitably led in many
cases to very convoluted and lengthy negotiations.
Certainly, if slow and careful work leads to decisions
that are relatively easy to implement, have a
minimum of unanticipated side-effects, and are
effective in achieving their goal, even lengthy times
spent in drafting could perhaps be acceptable.
However, the demand for unanimity appears to be
resulting in compromises which make the texts more
difficult to understand, with many exceptions, cross-
references and the use of lengthy, technical
provisions. Furthermore, the compromises tend to
lower the level of ambition of the original proposal,
leading to doubts as to whether the outcome will in
fact have “added value.”
The requirement that these decisions are to be made
by consensus was included in the Maastricht Treaty,
which brought justice and home affairs into the scope
of the work of the European Union. The reason was
that these issues can raise national sensibilities; after
all, they affect basic legal protections and basic
values. However, when the Maastricht Treaty was
drafted, the negotiators foresaw the possibility that
the EU might at a later stage wish to review how
decisions are taken. For this reason, the Treaty
contained a provision (now Article 42 of the Treaty
on the European Union) that allows the EU to change
the way decisions are made. According to article
42,
The Council, acting unanimously on the
initiative of the Commission or a Member
State, and after consulting the European
Parliament, may decide that action in areas
referred to in Article 29 shall fall under
Title IV of the Treaty establishing the
European Community, and at the same
time determine the relevant voting
conditions relating to it. It shall
recommend the Member States to adopt
that decision in accordance with their
respective constitutional requirements.
Translated into more understandable language, this
provision means that the Council can decide that
some or all matters involving cooperation in criminal
matters (including for example cooperation among
the police, prosecutors and judicial authorities)
would be transferred from the third pillar to the first
pillar. At the same time, the Council can decide that
decisions would henceforth be made by qualified
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majority. This transfer has several implications,
among them a stronger role for the Commission in
taking the initiative for new proposals, greater
involvement of the European Parliament in the
negotiation of proposals, and the elimination of the
requirement of unanimity among the twenty-five
Member States.
At the end of June 2006, at the same time as the
Commission presented its “Scoreboard Plus” on
progress in justice and home affairs, the Commission
also proposed that article 42 be applied. Finland, as
the holder of the Presidency of the EU during the
second half of 2006, has taken up the proposal
together with the Commission, and it will be
discussed throughout the remainder of the year. Both
the Commission and Finland argue that using article
2006 will result in greater efficiency in decision-
making, and – because of the stronger involvement
of the European Parliament – remedy what has been
called a “legitimacy deficit” (or “democracy
deficit”).
More proposals for approximation?
It is not clear how these three developments – the
ruling of the European Court of Justice on 13
September 2005, the difficulties in the negotiation
and implementation of decisions, and the proposal
for transfer of matters from the third pillar to the
first pillar – may affect the debate on approximation
in the European Union. The Commission and several
Member States have argued that one of the
underlying reasons for the difficulties in the
negotiation and implementation of mutual
recognition decisions is insufficient trust and
confidence in the criminal justice systems of other
Member States. If this trust and confidence can be
increased, negotiators (and courts) would be more
prepared to assume that judicial decisions taken in
other Member States are based on due process. The
Commission and the Member States in question
further argue that one of the main ways of increasing
trust and confidence is to develop EU-wide rules on
procedural guarantees, and to approximate
legislation criminalizing the key types of offences.
Given this orientation, it is possible that the
Commission will use the possibilities open to it to
present proposals along these lines. At the same time,
however, the decision to adopt each proposal will
ultimately rest with the Member States – either all
of them together (on the basis of unanimity) or a
large majority (should the Council decide to use the
Article 42 procedure referred to above). As a result,
it is likely that the scope of approximation will
gradually expand, but its scope will tend to be largely
limited to those offences which often have cross-
border effects (for example terrorism, various forms
of organized crime, crimes over the Internet) or are
directed against core EU interests (in particular,
offences directed against the financial interests of
the EU). Since the vast majority of offences that are
committed (such as property offences and violent
offences) usually do not have such effects, the
national criminal and procedural law of each
Member State will retain its own distinct elements.
5. The third claim: “European Union
cooperation in criminal justice is
leading towards a more punitive
criminal policy”
In particular since the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001 (followed, in Europe, by the train
bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004 and the
underground and bus bombings in London on 7 July
2005), the European Union has undertaken a number
of measures designed to respond to the threat of
terrorism and organized crime. Suspects and
convicted offenders can now be extradited
(surrendered) more quickly from one Member State
to another, information is being collected on the time
and length of telephone calls and on who calls
whom, the exchange of data between law
enforcement agencies is being simplified and
expedited, and so on.
Presumably there is wide-spread agreement that
these, and similar, decisions are a necessary part of
the unified response of the EU to terrorism and
organized crime. However, the way in which the
decisions were taken, and some of their contents,
have given rise to concerns that EU cooperation in
criminal justice stresses the law-and-order approach
and is moving towards a more punitive criminal
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policy. At the same time, according to these
concerns, the EU is giving less attention to human
rights and constitutional protections. The arguments
given to back up these concerns tend to follow three
different lines:
- the decision-making process suffers from
a “legitimacy deficit,” in that EU decisions
on police cooperation and cooperation in
criminal matters are prepared by civil
servants and made by Ministers, with
relatively little input from the European
Parliament or, on the part of several
Member States, with relatively little
oversight by national Parliaments.
Furthermore, the EU has set up a number
of institutions and networks (such as
Europol, Eurojust and the European
Judicial Network) with partly overlapping
mandates, lack of transparency and
insufficient respect for due process;
- the topics of EU decisions themselves
tend to focus excessively on law-and-order
themes (as opposed to procedural
safeguards), and the decisions themselves
do not sufficiently take into consideration
the requirements of due process and
constitutional protections; and
- in the decision-making process, the
contents of decisions tend to follow the
line of those Member States with a more
punitive criminal justice policy.
Does the EU third pillar suffer from a legitimacy
deficit?
The first argument takes the view that there is a
“legitimacy deficit” in decision-making in the third
pillar. It should be noted that there is no absolute
measure of the legitimacy of local, national or
international structures. However, the term implies
that decision-making in the EU is not open, and that
the EU has a tendency to emphasize efficiency of
crime control at the expense of accountability.30
Is there, indeed, a “legitimacy deficit”? The issue
needs to be analysed on both the EU and the national
level, and in respect both of legislative functions
(the Council on the EU level, and national
Parliaments) and executive / operational functions.
To turn first to the EU level and to legislative
functions, it is undeniable that the European
Parliament has a considerably weaker role in the
drafting of decisions in the third pillar, as compared
to the first pillar.31 In the third pillar, the European
Parliament is consulted about proposals. The opinion
of the European Parliament – usually in the form of
quite detailed proposals for amending the proposal
in question – is then considered by the Council. The
experience has been that relatively few amendments
proposed by the European Parliament are accepted.
There may be various reasons why so few proposed
amendments are accepted. One significant reason
is that the European Parliament has not had the
possibility of following the negotiations in the
Council on the proposal, and thus is probably not
aware of why certain formulations have been
preferred over others. Quite often, the European
Parliament proposals reflect ideas that had already
been considered – and rejected – in the Council
working groups. A second factor is that the text
prepared in the Council working groups has
benefited from input from legal experts from all
twenty-five Member States, and thus (presumably)
has been drafted so that it would fit in with the unique
features of each of the criminal justice systems.
Although the Members of the European Parliament
can avail themselves of highly professional staff
members, they do not necessarily have the same
working knowledge of criminal law, criminal
procedure and the operation of the criminal justice
system in each Member State. As a result, the
European Parliament may propose amendments that,
while they might be appropriate in some Member
States, may not have the same desired impact in
others.
30 For a discussion of the concept of “legitimacy deficit”, see Anthony Arnull and Daniel Wincott (eds.): Accountability and Legitimacy
in the European Union. Oxford Studies in European law, 2003.
31 This issue was mentioned above in section 4, where reference was made to the proposal of the Commission to apply Article 42 of the Treaty on
the European Union. This would lead to the shift of some or all of the contents of the third pillar to the first pillar. One of the results would be to
give the European Parliament a much stronger role in the negotiation of new decisions on police cooperation and cooperation in criminal justice.
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Another feature of decision-making on the EU level
is the almost total absence of direct input from
academia and civil society. On the national level,
various interest groups and experts are often heard
in the course of the decision-making process. This
is especially true of the drafting of legislation. Once
bills are introduced in Parliament, they generally
become available to the public, and the public has
an opportunity to provide an input.
In the EU, most proposals are submitted by the
Commission. When preparing proposals, the
Commission often arranges for public hearings, thus
providing groups active in EU matters an
opportunity to have their say. Once the proposals
are submitted to the Council, however, the process
becomes less transparent. Over the months and
(often) years that the proposal works its way from
the working group level up to the Council level
(where the decision is formally approved), it is very
difficult for persons outside of Government to know
how the proposal is evolving, much less what
reasons have been given for any changes made to
the text. EU working groups do not have the same
practice as many Parliamentary committees, of
holding public hearings on the proposals.
Even on the Council level, the debates have long
been closed to the public. Only as recently as June
2006 has the Council decided to increase the
transparency of its sessions by allowing web-casts
of at least part of its deliberations.
As for the EU level and operational functions, the
concerns over a “legitimacy deficit” has to do with
the perception that several EU institutions and
networks have been set up with partly overlapping
mandates and with insufficient transparency. The
usual point of comparison is national institutions,
which are generally subject to political and legal
oversight by the Government, by Parliament, by
ombudsmen, and similar bodies.
In the justice and home affairs sector, the main
institutions and networks in question are Europol,
Eurojust, OLAF, the Police Chief Task Force, the
Joint Situation Centre, Frontex, the European Police
College, and the European Judicial Network.
Of these, the European Police College (which helps
Member States in the training of senior police
officers) and the European Judicial Network (which
seeks to help practitioners identify how requests for
mutual legal assistance and extradition should be
formulated) do not appear to have raised any
concerns about “overlapping mandates and lack of
transparency.”
Two other institutions are quite new, and – perhaps
in part because of their newness – have also not
figured in this third pillar debate: the Joint Situation
Centre, and Frontex. The Joint Situation Centre
(SitCen), although it began work soon after 9/11,
did not begin to deal with internal security measures
until after the Madrid bombings in 2004. It provides
the Council with strategic intelligence-based
assessments on counter-terrorism matters. Frontex,
in turn, was set up to coordinate the activities of the
national border guards. Its role in respect of the third
pillar would thus relate primarily to helping
coordinate the national response to such offences
as trafficking in persons, drug trafficking and
smuggling.
Concerns regarding “overlapping mandates and lack
of transparency” would seem to concern primarily
Europol, Eurojust, OLAF and the Police Chief Task
Force. Each has a relatively distinct mandate.
Europol provides support for national law
enforcement agencies for example by facilitating the
exchange of information between them, providing
assistance in the analysis of intelligence, and helping
in the coordination of cross-border investigations.
Eurojust, in turn, coordinates the work of national
prosecuting authorities in the case of cross-border
investigations of serious organised crime. OLAF’s
mandate is focused on offences directed against the
financial interests of the EU.
Each of these three has built-in accountability
structures, such as Europol’s Management Board,
Eurojust’s Joint Supervisory Body and OLAF’s
Supervisory Committee. OLAF, as noted, is part of
the Commission. Both Europol and Eurojust report
to the Council.
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The Police Chief Task Force, in turn, brings together
top level law enforcement officials to exchange
experience and information on cross-border crime,
and to help in the planning of operational activities.
Unlike the other three institutions, the PCTF does
not have an explicit legal basis. Because it is
designed to bring together top law enforcement
officials, it is perhaps best described as an informal
network. It meets twice a year, once in a plenary
composition (in Brussels) and once for operational
planning (at Europol in The Hague). And because it
meets so rarely, it has less impact than does Europol
on day-to-day operational matters (which moreover
in any case remain the responsibility of national law
enforcement agencies).32
To turn to the national level and to the legislative
function, the main question in respect of the
“legitimacy deficit” is the extent to which
Governments consult with their Parliament at the
time proposals are being negotiated in working
groups in Brussels. Problems arise if little or no
consultation takes place, since once a framework
decision or a decision is adopted by the Council,
the Government has taken on the political
commitment (indeed, one could say a legal
commitment, since framework decisions and
decisions are binding according to the Treaty) to
“transpose” the framework decision into national
law and practice.
Each Member State has its own constitutional (and
political) arrangements for dealing with this
question. In the United Kingdom, for example, the
responsible Minister (usually the Home Secretary)
is required to inform Parliament in a very short time
of the tabling of a proposal in Brussels, and must
soon after report to Parliament on what position the
Government takes on this proposal. Members of
Parliament have the benefit of a staff that is quite
experienced in EU matters, and who follow
discussions in the working groups quite closely.
Another example is Finland, where Parliament has
a special “Grand Committee” to follow EU matters.
As in the UK, the Government in Finland must report
to Parliament on new proposals, and then on the
Government position on these proposals. In
particular the Legislative Committee often calls in
civil servants to provide information on EU
developments and on Government policy. In advance
of each Council meeting, the responsible Minister
must report to the Grand Committee on what items
are on the agenda, and on what the Government
position is to be.
Because of this close cooperation between
Government and Parliament, neither the United
Kingdom and Finland tend to have problems with
subsequent adoption of the national legislation
needed to implement EU decisions. In some other
Member States, where there is less cooperation,
problems have occurred more often.
In addition, a number of Member States must obtain
the approval of their Parliaments before agreeing in
Council to a decision. In most cases, this is a
formality, since the Parliaments in question have
been informed during the course of the negotiations
as to the expected contents of the decision. However,
in some cases last-minute amendments to the
proposals may cause problems between the
Government and Parliament.
As for operational functions on the national level,
the picture is relatively clear: Member States have
kept relatively tight control over who can carry out
operational activities in their territory. The main
principle, with few exceptions in theory and in
practice, is that only the authorities of the Member
State in question can carry out operational activities.
The few exceptions concern the Schengen
arrangements: hot pursuit, and cross-border
surveillance. In both cases, the Schengen
arrangements underline the fact that these are
32 One further EU body should be mentioned, the proposed Standing Committee on operational cooperation on internal security (COSI).
The proposal for COSI is included in the Constitutional Treaty, and is motivated at least in part by the fact that – if and when ratified – the
Constitutional Treaty would eliminate the need for the so-called Article 36 Committee, which coordinates the preparation of decisions on
police cooperation and cooperation criminal justice that are going to the Council. Discussions in 2005 focused largely on whether COSI
would be operational, strategic or legislative, or perhaps a mix of all three. The discussions were inconclusive, and were shelved when it
became clear that the Constitutional Treaty would not enter into force for some time to come.
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exceptions. A law enforcement officer in hot pursuit
of a suspect into the territory of a neighbouring
Member State, or conducting cross-border
surveillance, must inform the authorities of the
Member State concerned within a very brief time,
and only the authorities of that Member State can
use coercive measures (such as arrest). Also in the
case of joint investigative teams, where
representatives of the law enforcement agencies of
two or more Member State work together on a case,
there are clear rules as to who has the responsibility
and which law applies.
Does the EU focus on law-and-order themes at
the expense of due process and constitutional
protections?
The second argument mentioned above is that EU
decisions tend to focus on law-and-order themes and
do not pay enough attention to due process and
constitutional protections. One could, of course, try
to see to what extent this argument is true simply by
counting how many decisions deal with (for
example) improved cooperation or the creation of
new offence categories, as opposed to how many
decisions deal with protection of the rights of
suspects and defendants. However, such a count
would overlook the primary purpose of the third
pillar, which is to improve police cooperation and
cooperation in criminal matters. Arguing that since
the EU has adopted so many decisions on
criminalization and cross-border cooperation, and
so few decisions related to due process, would be
somewhat like faulting the police for spending too
much time chasing suspects and too little time
directing traffic or finding lost children.
Such a count would also overlook the fact that a
good deal of the negotiation in working groups, and
all the way up to the Council level, is focused
precisely on due process and constitutional
protections. The adoption of some proposals has
been slowed – and most recently in the case of the
proposed framework decision on racism and
xenophobia, has even been blocked – by
disagreements over the extent to which they
endangered constitutionally protected freedoms.
Even if there is no specific reference to due process
and constitutional freedoms (and, almost invariably,
such specific references are in fact made by many
delegations), EU decisions would have to conform
with the requirements of the European Convention
on Human Rights, and national commitments.
Is the EU becoming more punitive?
The third argument is a corollary of the second
argument: in part because of an alleged legitimacy
deficit (which lessens the impact of an electorally
accountable Parliament, or of non-governmental
organizations seeking to protect human rights)
efforts to develop a European criminal policy tend
to gravitate along the lines of the more punitive
countries.
The concept of punitiveness has several aspects. It
may be evident in the scope of criminalization: more
punitive countries would define a wider scope of
behaviour as criminal, and thus as requiring a
response by the authorities. It may also be evident
in the powers given to the police: more punitive
(law-and-order oriented) countries would allow the
police a greater range of investigative tools, ranging
from electronic surveillance to detention for
extended periods without trial, and with fewer and
lighter judicial supervision over their use. And it
may be evident in the type and severity of sanctions:
more punitive countries would use more invasive
sanctions (in particular, imprisonment), and for
longer periods.
To turn first to the idea that the scope of criminal
behaviour is widening in the EU, it is true that, as
noted in section 3.6, the EU has adopted a very large
number of recommendations, resolutions, joint
actions and framework decisions calling upon
Member States to criminalise certain forms of
behaviour. However, in practice this has only rarely
led to the need in Member States to amend their
national laws, since most of what has been required
on the EU level had already been implemented
nationally: such basic offences as fraud, drug
trafficking, trafficking in persons, corruption, money
laundering, and so on, are already defined in
domestic criminal law.
In those cases where national legislation was lacking,
often the Member State in question would closely
question why the criminalization is necessary, and
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would generally succeed in obtaining flexibility in
the application of the new decision. The most recent
example of this is the framework decision on
participation in a criminal organisation, where one
of the issues was whether it should be an offence to
be a member of a criminal organisation if in fact the
organisation has not taken any concrete measures
to carry out any offence. Some Member States
objected to such a criminalisation, and it was
removed from the text.
As for the scope of police powers, there are in fact
few EU decisions on the matter (see section 3.6),
and they do not appreciably expand the scope of
police powers in any of the Member States. Police
powers could in theory be expanded through
decisions on mutual recognition. One could assume
that if a court must recognize a decision given by a
court in another Member State, this might require
that court to also recognize the wider police powers
allowed in that other State. However, the EU
decisions on mutual recognition have been
formulated so as not to require Member States to
carry out measures which are not in accord with their
constitutional principles.
It is perhaps in respect of the type and severity of
sanctions that there is the most visible tendency to
increase the punitive level in the EU. The indirect
cause of this is the argument that the level of
sanctions should be approximated (if not
harmonized) across the EU. In its Green Paper on
the approximation, mutual recognition and
enforcement of criminal sanctions in the European
Union (COM(2004)334 final), the Commission lists
a number of arguments for such approximation:
- the symbolism of defining common
offences and penalties in relation to certain
forms of crime;
- the development of a shared sense of
justice;
- the pedagogic value of signalling that
certain forms of conduct are unacceptable
and punishable on an equivalent basis;
- the corollary of a European area of
justice, that the same criminal conduct
incurs similar penalties wherever the
offence is committed in the EU;
- the role of EU minimum standards in
preventing offenders from “forum
shopping”;
- easing acceptance of the ne bis in idem
principle;
- the argument that the current focus on
instruments based on the principle of
mutual recognition has eliminated the
need for certain mechanisms for judicial
cooperation that depended on the level of
penalties;
- the link between approximation of
criminal law and the effective
implementation of a Union policy where
harmonisation measures have been taken;
and
- easing acceptance of mutual recognition.
At least the following points can be made regarding
the objectives identified in the Green Paper.
The symbolic value of common offences and
penalties. The definition of and, to a growing extent,
maximum minimum penalties for, key offences with
transnational aspects are already covered by EU
instruments. Even without EU instruments, these
offences are already extensively covered by national
law. Since the individual criminal justice systems
thus have the necessary tools to respond to these
crimes, it is questionable whether any “message”
on an EU level would add anything of substance.
There does not appear to be any criminological
evidence that such a symbolic message would have
an appreciable impact.
The development of a shared sense of justice. This
argument is closely analogous with the preceding
one, the symbolic value of common offences and
penalties. The legal sociology literature contains
considerable material on the concept of a sense of
justice, including on the extent to which such a sense
of justice can be fostered. The sense of justice varies
extensively within countries, even within
communities. From this point of view, it can be
doubted whether approximation would have the
desired effect.
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The pedagogic value of signalling that certain forms
of conduct are unacceptable and punishable on an
equivalent basis. This is a rather ambiguous
objective. As noted, the key offences are already
criminalized through the EU, and so there is no
demonstrable need for a pan-European “signal” that
these forms of conduct are unacceptable. Stating that
the objective is to have such conduct “punished on
an equivalent basis” would seem in this context to
be an example of circular reasoning: the objective
of approximation is justified by invoking the
objective of approximation.
The corollary of a European area of justice, that the
same criminal conduct incurs similar penalties
wherever the offence is committed in the Union. The
concept of a “European area of justice” does not
necessarily require similar penalties throughout the
EU; what would seem to be fundamental is that the
same standard of justice is applied in all Member
States. The analogy to a federal State can be made:
no one would deny that federal states constitute
“areas of justice,” even though the law is drafted
and applied somewhat differently in the different
Länder, cantons or other administrative units.
The role of Union minimum standards in preventing
offenders from “forum shopping.” There does not
appear to be any criminological evidence that
offenders in fact decide where to commit an offence
on the basis of which Member State has the laxest
law or the most lenient punishment. To the extent
that offences are planned (as seems to be the case
with most serious cross-border crimes, although a
large number even of these offences are
opportunistic), the factors offenders take into
consideration include the expected gain and the risk
of apprehension. The gravity of the likely
punishment if apprehended and convicted tends to
play considerably less of a role, if for no other reason
than the implicit assumption made by most offenders
that they will not be apprehended.
Easing acceptance of the “ne bis in idem” principle.
Since in practice there are few cases where the ne
bis in idem principle applies, its use as an
independent objective has limited value.
The argument that the current focus on instruments
based on the principle of mutual recognition has
eliminated the need for certain mechanisms for
judicial cooperation that depended on the level of
penalties. The logic behind this objective appears
to be difficult to discern. The fact that, for example,
extradition is conditioned on a certain minimum
level of expected penalty, and that extradition has
largely been replaced by the use of the EU arrest
warrant, would seem to have nothing to do with
approximation of criminal sanctions one way or the
other.
The link between approximation of criminal law and
the effective implementation of a Union policy where
harmonisation measures have been taken. Although
article III-172(2) of the Constitutional Treaty (which,
it should be noted, is not – yet – in force) does indeed
make a link between approximation of criminal law
and the effective implementation of a Union policy,
this article simply sets out one of the (legal)
conditions for further approximation.
Easing acceptance of mutual recognition. As noted
in section 4, a theoretical argument can indeed be
made that approximation promotes the acceptance
of the principle of mutual recognition. However, in
that context, the reference is usually to the
approximation of substantive criminal law and
procedural law, not to the approximation of
sanctions. There is little evidence on any linkage
between mutual recognition and similarities or
dissimilarities in the levels of punishment.
The issue here, however, is not whether or not the
approximation of sanctions on an EU-wide level is
desirable, but what impact approximation would
have on the type and severity of punishment. It is,
of course, possible to agree, throughout the EU, that
the goal of approximation should be a relatively
modest level of sanctions: extensive use of non-
custodial sanctions, for example, and if and when
custodial sanctions are used, having as short a
sentence as possible. There are indeed strong
arguments for seeking wider promotion of a rational
and human criminal policy.
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The debate in the EU over the approximation of
sanctions was at its hottest during the first years of
the present decade. In connection with the drafting
of almost each new decision on criminalisation,
some Member States with relatively high penal
latitudes would suggest that their levels be taken as
the point of departure, and that Member States with
more lenient latitudes would have to adjust at least
their minimum sentences accordingly. Almost
invariably, when representatives of the latter
Member States would defend their own levels of
punishment as appropriate, representatives of the
first group would respond with the admonition: “but
having a low level of sentences would send the
wrong political signal!”
The continuous debates were calmed by the
adoption, on 26 April 2002, of Council conclusions
that essentially stated that subsequently, offences
would be divided into four levels, with different
“minimum maximums” (i.e., the lowest maximum
sentence that each Member State was required to
enact into its national law): 1 – 3 years for level one
offences, 2 to 5 years for level 2 offences, 5 to 10
years for level three cases, and at least 10 years for
level four cases.
It may be noted here that what was distinctly absent
from the discussion was the suggestion that some
“levels” should lead to fines or other non-custodial
sanctions. There were understandable reasons for
this. The most important is presumably that the EU
focuses on serious cross-border crime. Such a
concept may inevitably lead most observers (and
negotiators) to make the assumption that no matter
what the individual offence is, if it is a “serious cross-
border crime”, it must merit imprisonment.
6. Pulling it all together: what is the
reality behind the myths?
This paper has looked at three common “myths”
about the impact of the European Union on criminal
justice: EU decisions have little impact on reality,
the EU is becoming a super-state with a harmonized
criminal and procedural law, and the EU is focusing
on the control of crime at the expense of due process
and constitutional protections, resulting in a law-
and-order mentality and a more punitive criminal
justice system.
Regarding the first opinion of the EU, it does not
hold true. The EU has been actively engaged in home
and justice affairs for somewhat over ten years (if
one ignores the informal cooperation that evolved
before the Maastricht Treaty entered into force), and
in that time the extent and scope of police
cooperation and cooperation in criminal justice has
far outpaced cooperation elsewhere. In many areas,
the EU is breaking new ground, and other regions
and subregions are beginning to see to what extent
they can adapt EU forms of cooperation to their own
circumstances.
Although it appears that the process of negotiating
new decisions has slowed in the EU, new decisions
are still being prepared.
The second opinion of the EU also does not hold
true, in that there are strong institutional and other
factors that limit the extent to which the Member
States are prepared to harmonize their criminal and
procedural law. Many Member States emphasize that
their interest in greater cooperation extends only to
serious forms of cross-border crime: they are not
prepared to approximate legislation on forms of
crime that usually do not have cross-border
implications.
The third opinion of the EU is true to the extent that
much of what the EU is doing in police cooperation
and cooperation in criminal justice is designed to
make such cooperation more effective. However,
many Member States are quite sensitive to
arguments of due process and fundamental rights,
and the end result – the EU decision that has to be
implemented on the national level – tends to reflect
a balance between what is known in the
criminological literature as the “crime control
model” and the “due process model.”
As noted at the outset, the European Union
represents a unique form of international
cooperation. However, the tensions and assumptions
reflected in the three myths described in this paper
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are not unique to the EU. To a large extent, they
appear also in debates on criminal justice on the
national level.
On this national level, members of the public,
representatives of the media and often also
practitioners may be quick to suggest that the
politicians and the criminal justice system are not
in fact doing anything (or at least are not doing
enough) about the “crime problem.”
The idea that the EU is becoming a “super-state”
that is taking over from the Member States has its
own parallel in the debate on what is known as
“green criminal policy,” the idea advocated by
scholars such as Louk Hulsman, Derick McClintock
and Nils Christie that the State has too much power
in defining what is criminal, and is too active in
intervening in the lives of citizens – victims and
alleged offenders alike.
As for the idea that the EU is a law-and-order
advocate, also this has a familiar ring on the national
level. Criminology has seen both short-term and
long-term swings from periods of punitive criminal
policy to periods of more liberal criminal policy,
and back again. (At the time of this writing,
politicians in some EU Member States are
advocating restoration of the death penalty.)
What can be said is that over the past ten years, the
European Union has transformed the European
debate on criminal policy. Many key debates which
had previously been conducted on the national level
have now moved to the European Union level, and
European Union decisions have considerable
influence on national law, policy and practice.
Agreement has been reached on the minimum
requirements when criminalising a number of
different offences (such as trafficking in human
beings and sexual exploitation of children, and
participation in a criminal organization).
International co-operation in criminal matters has
been smoothed by the establishment of Europol,
Eurojust and the European Judicial Network, and
by a fairly rigorous system for mutual evaluation of
the day-to-day practice in international co-operation.
Conventions have been adopted in order to simplify
extradition and mutual assistance. The growing
scope of mutual recognition has made the
enforcement of court decisions and judgments much
more rapid and effective.
At the same time, the European Union is entering
into new territory. The current debates for example
on transferring the contents of the third pillar to the
first pillar, and on finding the proper balance
between mutual recognition and approximation
show that there is keen interest in improving the
ability of the twenty-five Member States of the EU
to work together to find the proper response to
criminal justice issues, a response that balances
effectiveness with due process guarantees.
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